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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS IN AND FOR
THE STATE OF UTAH
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF:
REPLY BRIEF
OF APPELLANT

LEONARD D. WATERS,
Deceased.

HELENA WATERS, personal
representative of the Estate of Leonard D.
Waters,

Case No. 20000017-CA

Petitioner/Appellant,
vs.
DARLA JORGENSON, JEANNA
SCOTT, BARBARA D. REYNOLDS,
THEODORA ANN (TEDDI) BROWN,
SHERRIE M. ALLAN, and FREDERICK
L. WATERS,
Respondents/Appellees.
Petitioner/Appellant, Helena Waters, hereby submits this Reply Brief to the Brief of
Respondents/Appellees, Darla Jorgenson, Jeanna Scott, Barbara D. Reynolds, Theodora Ann
(Teddi) Brown, Sherrie M. Allan, and Frederick L. Waters.
RESPONSE TO RESPONDENTS' STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Statement of Facts contained in Petitioner's initial brief contains a complete and
concise description of the facts of this case and the basis for the appeal. Respondents have
accepted Petitioner's Statement of Facts as set forth in her initial brief "except where
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specifically controverted herein". The word "herein" is not defined and there is no statement
or list of controverted facts set forth in Respondents' brief, only allegations in the text of
their arguments that are not in the record on appeal. There were not any evidentiary hearings
nor any clearly defined findings of fact in the trial court record except as may be reflected
in the interlocutory orders which are the subject of this appeal. Consequently, "facts" are
limited to documentary exhibits in the record and the Orders of the trial court.
The Respondents' "Statement of the Case" is a verbatim recitation from their
Memorandum in Opposition to Petitioner's Motions (R. 131-136). Unfortunately, that
memorandum also did not include a required statement of facts, and many of the
representations made therein are inaccurate, incomplete, and, in some cases, false. There is
nofindingin the record which states that "at the time of his [Decedent's] death he held title
in joint tenancy to a residence in Tooele, with his wife [Helena Waters]". There is no
finding in the record which states that Decedent "had a pension with survivor benefits". The
Honorable L. A. Dever did enter an Order approving the Nevada settlement in which the
proceeds of that action were paid into the estate. (R.67-69). Respondents are in error in
their assertion that a personal property allowance in the sum of $5,000.00 and a family
allowance were denied by the District Court. The Court found in paragraph 4 of its Order
dated March 16, 2000 (R. 219-221) that an evidentiary hearing would be necessary to
determine the extent of any personal property allowance "conditioned on the value of the
personal property of the estate". The Court also found that an evidentiary hearing was
necessary on the question on whether a family allowance should be awarded to Petitioner as
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Decedent's spouse. (R.220). Respondents have taken great license in their brief making
representations of fact in the "Statement of the Case" that are not supported by the record.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The arguments set forth herein are in specific response to four points made by
Respondents in their brief. Although Respondents did not specifically respond in numerical
order to the points set forth in Petitioner's brief, Petitioner will address in numerical order
the points raised by Respondents.

Petitioner will coalesce her arguments against

Respondents' first two arguments into one because they are integrally related.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT WAS UNDER A CLEAR
AND UNEQUIVOCAL DUTY TO ABIDE BY
THE JUNE 22, 1999 ORDER OF JUDGE
DEVER.
Respondents argue that the Trial Court was under no duty to adhere to the June 22,
1999 Interlocutory Order of Judge L.A. Dever. (R. 67-69). Before an examination of the
case law regarding the "law of the case" doctrine by Respondents, they assert as fact the
following allegations, which allegations are clearly false and can only be assumed to be
designed to intentionally misrepresent the issues before this Court.
First Respondents mischaracterize the language and intent of the stipulation of the
parties to the Nevada action. (R.16-17, Exhibit "E"). The stipulation was entered into
between the various plaintiffs to allow the net proceeds of the setdement to be paid to the
Decedent's estate for administration pursuant to the Utah laws of descent and
3

distribution, not for a subsequent allocation to the various plaintiffs depending on the
relative strengths of their positions under the original complaint. Second, the stipulation
was not prepared by counsel for Petitioner, but was prepared by Bob Benton, the attorney
for both Petitioner and Respondents in the Nevada action. Petitioner' s attorney in this action
had no involvement whatsoever with the preparation of or the wording of the stipulation.
Petitioner's attorney did not enter an appearance until April 26, 1999, nine days after the
parties had apparently executed the stipulation and after he had been contacted by Bob
Benton and Robert Hughes, Petitioner5 s original attorney for the estate and asked to represent
Petitioner. (R. 12-13). The stipulations specifically state that the "net proceeds be paid to
the estate of Leonard Waters, deceased, to be distributed by the estate now pending in Utah
under Utah law of descent and distribution". (R. 16).
Third, Respondents further allege in their Argument that the legal consequences of
paying money into the estate in Utah was never explained to them. Please note the letter
of Bob Benton dated April 13,1990 to his clients (R. 168-169), cited in Petitioner's original
brief, but cited here again because of the Respondents' apparent refusal to acknowledge its
existence.
As I have explained to you all before, Mr. Waters' medical
expenses exceeded $100,000 as a result of his injuries. The suit
was brought for his personal injury. That claim survived his
death and is being brought by the estate. Normally this
character of a claim is an asset of the estate and is
distributed under the laws of distribution of the state in
which the deceased was a resident. In this case, of course, it
is Utah. Please seek local counsel in this respect as I am not
competent to advise as to the Utah law in this respect....
4

Normally, this claim would require the testimony of the various
surviving children and surviving widow as to the individual loss
as to society, companionship, affection, as well as pecuniary
loss. Obviously, Mrs. Waters has money loss. It is my
understanding that none of the children lost money by virtue of
Mr. Waters' demise. In this respect, there is a conflict of
interest between my various clients. As a result I have
requested all of you to seek independent legal representation
when it comes to distribution of the limited proceeds being
generated by this lawsuit. .. .
I ask the surviving daughters to contact counsel and have the
lawyer call me with reference to how to handle the
distribution of this small net recovery. Jeanna called and
indicated that the surviving daughters all got together and
agreed that it should go into the estate and be distributed
under Utah law of descent and distribution. I was hoping to
get a letter from them confirming their agreement in this respect
after having the opportunity to seek legal advice in this respect.
(Emphasis added). (R. 168-169).
Respondents further cite paragraph 9 of the June 22, 1999 Order (R. 67-69) for the
position that the stipulation was only a "measure of convenience" without a determination
as to how the settlement would eventually be distributed. Respondents choose to ignore the
clear language of paragraph 8 of that Order, which states:
8. Since the aforementioned settlement did not differentiate
between the various claims of the estate and those of the
individual plaintiffs, the plaintiffs stipulated and agreed that the
net proceeds from the settlement of the aforementioned lawsuit
shall be considered an asset of the decedent's estate and shall be
distributed to the heirs of the decedent's estate according to the
laws of the intestate succession for the State of Utah. (R.168169).
Respondents seem to now assert that they were unaware that the Probate Code as adopted
in Utah dealing in cases of intestate succession prioritizes certain payments of probate estate
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assets prior to ultimate distribution to the heirs. Included in this prioritization are the
payment of funeral expenses, estate administration expenses, statutory allowances, payment
of claims, and other expenses fixed as to priority of payment by statute before any
distribution is made to the surviving heirs. Utah Code Ann. §75-3-805 and §§75-2-401
through 404 (pre-1998 law).
The Respondents ignore the various cases cited by Petitioner in support of the "law
of the case" doctrine as adopted in Utah. Instead, Respondents attempt to find sole support
for their position in a misapplication of the holding in AMS Salt Industries, Inc. v. Mag.
Corp. of America, 942 P.2d 315 (Utah 1997), a case also originally cited by Petitioner. In
AMS Salt Industries, the Utah Supreme Court supported an exception to the "law of the
case" doctrine where issues decided by the first judge were presented to the second judge in
a "different light", specifically in that case where a summary judgment initially denied was
subsequently granted after additional evidence was adduced. IdL at 319. There is no such
situation in this case. There was no additional evidence adduced, only an apparent change
of heart by the Respondents after petitions for statutory allowances werefiledby Petitioner.
Respondents argue that they were "trapped" by Petitioner who did not file petitions for
homestead, exempt personal property, or family allowances prior to the filing of a petition
for adjudication of intestacy and for approval of the Nevada settlement. However, the
Respondents choose to ignore the fact that there were no assets in the probate estate to
petition for the award of homestead, exempt personal property, or family allowances prior
to the receipt of the Nevada settlement. Certainly, had Respondents consulted with counsel,
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Respondents would have been advised of the existence of those allowances under Utah Law.
Counsel would have also advised Respondents that the allowances were statutorily
guaranteed to the surviving spouse, who has a legislatively-recognized closer relationship
requiring monetary protection with a deceased spouse than the adult children of any previous
marriage. Utah Code Ann. §75-2-102, §75-2-201 et seq.. and §75-2-401 et seq. (pre-1998
law).
Respondents further assert that Petitioner, who is also the personal representative of
Decedent's estate, now claims that the money from the Nevada settlement is exclusively
hers. No where in the record, the pleadings, petitions, motions, orders, or anywhere else has
Petitioner made any such claim or assertion, and Respondents offer no citation to the record
to support this claim.
Finally, Respondents obfuscate the real issues by arguing that (1) Petitioner is not
entitled to a claim for loss of marital consortium under Utah law; (2) Utah law limits
wrongful death actions to a claim for the benefit of heirs; (3) interpleader is "the only thing
that made sense . . . to compel conflicting complainants to litigate their claims among
themselves"; and (4) again, Petitioner and her counsel drafted the stipulation between the
parties to intentionally deceive them, which assertion explained earlier, is categorically false.
The causes of action set forth in the Nevada action arose from an auto-pedestrian
accident occurring in Nevada, involving a defendant who was a resident of Nevada and a
vehicle that was registered in Nevada, and that was filed and Utigated in Nevada and settled
under Nevada law. Whether or not Utah recognizes a claim for loss of marital consortium
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is completely irrelevant. Utah's statutes relating to wrongful death are equally irrelevant.
The assertion by Respondents on page 8 that because "the decedent was a resident of the
State of Utah . . . [then he] certainly did not have sufficient contacts in Nevada to warrant
the use of Nevada law under accepted principles of conflicts of law" is completely
unsubstantiated. While Petitioner is not aware of any Utah decisions directly on point, there
is ample authority in the decisions of neighboring states. In Lombardo v. Pollock 521 P.2d
636, 637-8 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1974), the court found in a dispute as to the proceeds of a
wrongful death settlement that damages received, whether by action, settlement or
compromise, are to be distributed, apportioned or disposed of in accordance with provisions
of the law of the state under whose statute the right to recovery accrued or the law of the
place where the death-causing injury occurred rather than the law of the decedent's domicile.
(A copy of Lombardo is attached at Appendix 7 to this Reply Brief). The same general rule
applies in Washington, New Mexico, Kansas, and Oklahoma. See Johnson v. Spider Staging
Corp., 555 P.2d 997, 1002 (Wash. 1976); First Nat. Bank v. Benson, 553 P.2d 1288, 1289
(N.M. Ct. App. 1976) cert denied 558 P.2d 619; McDaniel v. Sinn, 400 P.2d 1018, 1021
(Kansas 1965); and Cherokee Laboratories, Inc. v. Rogers. 398 P.2d 520, 524 (Okla. 1965).
Furthermore, interpleader was not the appropriate remedy in this case to allow the
Petitioner and Respondents to resolve competing claims. This is an action under the Utah
Probate Code for the proper administration of a decedent's estate. It is a probate issue to
determine whether or not statutory homestead and exempt personal property allowances are
absolute. It does not involve questions of fact, but rather the application of law. While a
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petition for a family allowance involves evidentiary issues and questions of fact as to the
amount, if any, and the duration of such an allowance, the same is not true for homestead and
exempt personal property allowances. It is also a function of probate to determine the
amounts to be paid for funeral expenses, costs of administration, statutory allowances, and
creditor claims, before any distribution to heirs. Neither the trial court nor the Respondents
seem to grasp this fact.
POINT II
THE SURVIVING SPOUSE'S ENTITLEMENT
TO A HOMESTEAD IS ABSOLUTE IN UTAH
UNDER PRIOR LAW.
Respondents argue that the agreement between the parties was "done on the
assumption that all of the family members would take something thereunder". Otherwise,
there would have been no agreement. There is absolutely nothing in the stipulation nor in
correspondence between the parties supporting this position or contention. There were no
discussions between the parties except through their mutual attorney, Bob Benton. There
is not any affidavit by the Respondents in the record suggesting that they were misled or
mistaken as to the effect of Utah law dealing with intestate succession. Instead,
Respondents obfuscate the clear language of Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-401 (pre-1998 law) with
the unrelated homestead exemption statute of Utah Code Ann. §78-3-3. Respondents then
try to make an unsupported equitable argument that since Petitioner and the Decedent held
a home in joint tenancy which the Petitioner acquired by operation of law upon the
Decedent's death, that operation of law bars her claim to a homestead allowance. What
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Respondents neglect to state is that said home was purchased many years prior to Decedent's
death solely with the assets of Petitioner and that over the years said home had been
repeated^- ?

,r

mid support: obli^alioik/i lo his

prior wife. Consequently, Petitioner received v

• eauitv i

Decedent's death since it had been used to satisfy his ongoing child support obligations.
Hi ii. "I ci

IIHIM'

hi is a*. m,il ii i'the existence of a joint tenancy, are not in the record and

should not, therefore, be consider
Respondents finally argue thai to read the law as suggested by Petitioner is to
entirely disinherit the rest of the family". That statement clearly demonstrates an ignorance
of the Responds

hdnml HK- I luilorni holiaU i "ode as adopted

in Utah and in many other states. That intent was to protect the depend?
and to provide a minimum "safety net" in the event of the death of a spouse or parent of
11 Hi 11IH i / l l i M l V i

That intent has been expressed

e

deciding former law, the Utah Supreme Court clearly stated that since the homestead
allowance was a constitutional creation, all laws relating thereto were to be liberally
constructed to fwoffil if In Kc Mower's listau

*

*

I, Jtah

Supreme Court said the same thing in In Re Petersen's Estate, 93 P.2d 445, 11«' U tali 193 9)
and further stated that "the amount of property owned by the person claiming homestead is
not material to „!111vin inmn11nil »111 1 vv m ni • il 11 i il momestead

-

. anowed". I d at 449

a former law (Section 101-4-6, R.S.U. 1933), the Court also stated
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('iting
i

no showing of dependence on a homestead and no reason appears why we should require
such. Id
The public policy consideration behind the homestead were incorporated into the
Uniform Probate Code provisions originally enacted in Utah in 1975. The statute relating
to homestead allowance has been amended several times, but those amendments are not
germane or instructive to the issue before this Court. The jurisdictions of Idaho and
Montana, having identical statutory provisions as Utah, have addressed the issue in a clear
and unequivocal manner, and this Court should defer to their precedent.
Respondents attempt to distinguish the Montana case of Matter of Estate of Merkei
618 P.2d 872 (Mont. 1980) by suggesting the decision was somehow based upon prior
Montana law which provided only for a "life estate" as a homestead. If that rationale were
true, the Montana court would have reached the exact opposite decision. Thefinalityof a
fee allowance, whether in real property or in other assets including cash, flies in the face of
an award of a "life estate" or other support of a temporary nature. The Idaho case of
Simmons v. Ewing, 529 P. 2d 776 (Idaho 1974) is not even addressed in Respondent's brief.
(Copies of both decisions are attached hereto at Appendix 8 to this Reply Brief).
The Respondents then cite the Colorado case of In re Estate of Robbie J. Dodge. 685
P.2d 260 (Colo. App. 1984) as supporting the proposition that a "homestead exemption" is
outdated throwback to the Nineteenth Century and therefore should be disregarded.
However, that court awarded a homestead to the decedent's minor children and reversed the
trial court's awarding of a homestead to her estranged husband (and stepfather to the minor
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children) who the decedent had evicted from her solely-owned home one month prior to her
death. I he Respondents I ail lo mention that the Colorado statutes dealing with exempt
|MM|K:it>

iiiiiiiiiii mill ' itJiLL.i i i hl>

\ i i I I in i n snj

d umpi in n i t i t l i is attached as

Appendix 9 to this Reply Brief) are dramatically different from IJtah *
the Uniform Probate Code, C.RS § 15-11-403 provides for the payment of cash or other
I'l'f'i |n;iifv

| ill • cslak (o the surviving spouse of a value of fifteen thousand dollars

($15,000.00) as allowances

;.Aemptpers0Ilaj

property allowances under the pre-1998 laws between Utah, Idaho, and Montana,
Respondents also cite Estate of Liccardo. 232 Cal.App.3d 962 (Cal App. 6 Dist. 1support loin ffini! pmpi siln ii llli nil I ahl>

law requires a homestead be in the form i

estate only. However, Respondents fail to inform the G
is substantially different from Utah law, and at the time Liccardo was decided, California law
ill; to limited homestead allowances to a "life interest

Liccardo primarily stands foi Ik

proposition that any allow
estate, and not from any separate property owned by the surviving spouse, which was what
the Respondents asked the trial court to do if a homestead was warranted, fd at 966
Finally, Respoi'dnil < Hi iVLitiei ul'hstaleol Wagley. ">0 P id lit., HH|H|,ili 1988)
as support for their contention that Utah law bars "the award of a homestead allowance if
there is not any real property in the probate estate. Respondents argue that because no
liioiiiii, ?»lii*inl i II - HI in i I HIS i vii 11-quested in that case, "that absence of or failure to request
an allowance constitutes binding authority ;md pn'siLKnr iirpumenl wliv
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allowance is not authorized in this case. Such is the inescapable conclusion Respondents
demand this Court follow, and exemplifies the nature of their arguments throughout their
brief.
Petitioner submits that the arguments of Respondents are unsupported in law or in
fact This Court is being asked to decide a case of first impression in Utah. Unfortunately,
the decision may not have much impact beyond this case. Effective July 1, 1998, the Utah
Legislature repealed Utah Code Ann. §§75-2-401 through 404 (pre-1998 law), and enacted
a new §§75-2-401 through 405. (Copies of said statutes are attached at Appendix 10 to this
Reply Brief). However, since the Decedent died before July 1,1998, the new statute is not
applicable to this case.
Under the statutes in effect in this case, a surviving spouse (of a decedent who died
intestate leaving childrenfroma prior marriage) divided the probate estate equally with those
children after administration of the estate. Utah Code Ann. §75-2-102. Administration
included payment of funeral bills, costs of administration, expenses of decedent's last illness,
payment of statutory allowances, payment of priority and secured claims, and payment to
general unsecured creditors. Utah Code Ann. §75-3-805 (pre-1998 law). The new statute
relating to homestead allowance is rendered moot by the adoption of new Utah Code
Ann. §75-2-402 (which replaced the old statute 401) and other changes in the Utah Probate
Code). Utah Code Ann. §75-2-102 now provides that the surviving spouse of an intestate
decedent shall receive the first $50,000.00 in any estate, plus one-half (Vi) of the balance,
and incorporates the homestead and exempt personal property allowances therein as non-
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probate transfers as defined by Utah Code Ann. §75-2-206 (pre-1998 law)

1 hv I 'did

Legislature has therefore resolved any future dispute as to the intent of the former Utah Code
A l l , §§'7S-^ .|oi iliiihinifiji iuiMi n 1111 • I'i'Mhi iMwj by clearly manifesting an intention to initially
pro vide a safety net of assets for the surviving spouse brio 1 " «in fJislnhilioi!' - Hlit 1 liwr
including adult children from a prior marriage, is made.
POINT ffl
PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO AN EXEMPT
PERSONAL PROPERTY ALT. OWANCE
UNDER PRIOR LAW.
Contrary to Respondent's contentions, Petitioner clearly addressed the issue of the
t1 Mj"iiip( fifir'siiiiiiiiil |i> ii|ii iiiy" {ill i1 vi 'una1 n hei initial brief. Ihe family allowance issue is not
an Issue on appeal. Without being redundant, tb*

• *-

- Manei of Estate

ofWaglev has resolved the exempt personal property allowance issue in favor of Petitioner.
I (1|| ;1

(|| |ii;|| c o u r t c i e a r iy

abused its discretion and erred as a matter of law is making such an

allowance condition*' ' >

\P

» '" 'MilniM'n ,'

i , JrltTmrnc the extent and value of

IKMIIMI

exempt personal property in which the Decedent had an interest
CONCLUSION
1 h r I mi ml ni il I il in ni nil n ilc* mi i ill ii ni c d b e e e m b e i i i i
ereor, both in fact and in law. The Orders collective h

l|!

»MIL

iiml March 16, 2000 are clearly in
*

JM PI "ii|ustiu.

ii|"» l^iitioiiei,

who has been forced to expend limited estate resources to defend against the spurious claims
of R espondeiiLs

A hile some ambiguity may have existed as to the clear intent of former

Utah Code Aim. 98 7 S - ? -401 thrr *

was no ambiguity in the June

22, 1999 Order of Judge Dever, nor is there any ambiguity in the clear intent of the Utah
Legislature in the new modifications to the Utah Probate Code. This Court can and should
consider subsequent changes of a law to determine legislative intent. Such was the position
taken by the Arizona Supreme Court in Lombardo.
It is not inappropriate for this court to look to subsequent
changes of the law in support of its own views of the prior act
.. .(citations omitted). As stated in the case of City of Mesa v.
KillingsworflL 96 Arz. 290, 394 P.2d 410 (1964):
. . . The Legislature has now clearly expressed its
intention consistent with the construction which
we believe should be placed on the former
statutes. An amendment which, in effect,
construes and clarifies a prior statute will be
accepted as the legislative declaration of the
original act. (Citations omitted).
Lombardo at 639 citing City of Mesa at 414.
Petitioner respectfully requests this Court to reverse the December 13, 1999 and
March 16, 2000 Orders and remand this matter to the trial court with clear instructions to
award Petitioner a statutorily-mandated homestead and exempt personal property allowance.
DATED this 27th day of October, 2000.

BARTHOLOMEW
Petitioner
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed two (2) copies of the foregoing Reply Brief of Petitioner
1, V, ^mli ev, McCullough, Attorney for Respondents, 895 West Center Street, Orem, Utah
84057, postage prepaid, this )_Mh da\ H <», \v\ :i ,'<"»>

f^A~^
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APPENDIX 7

\ n z \ p p 'ITT
Shirlev LOMBARDO Petitioner
v
Elaine S POLLOCK as Guardian of the Estate of L*»w-e-»_<j D Lombardo, a minor
and Hon Ri nam N Roylston, a* j j d g e
of the Superior Court in and For the County of Pima Arizona, Respondents
No 2 CA-CIV 1612
Lourt of Aj^peils of Arizona,
Division 2
April 17 1974
Rohe iring Denied May 22, 1974
Review Denied J u n e 11, 1974
P e t i t i o n e r sought by special action to
v a c a t e a n o r d e r distributing proceeds ot a
w r o n g f u l d e a t h settlement
T h e Court of
Appeals, H o w a r d J , held t h a t statutorv
provision r e q u i r i n g distribution of w r o n g
ful death proceeds according to laws of in
testacy applies only w h e n action is brought
o n behalf of estate, and t h a t proceeds of
settlement m a d e by deceased's wife on be
half of herself a n d minor child in w r o n g
ful death action w e r e to be distributed to
wife a n d child in proportion to their dam
ages, r a t h e r t h a n m equal p r o p o r t i o n
Relief

granted,

order

vacated

\s

directions
1 Death C^8
T h e r e w a s no reason to look to law or
California g o v e r n i n g wrongful death to de
t e r m i n e distribution of proceeds of w r o n g
ful d e a t h settlement made in Arizona bv
California beneficiaries w h e r e there was
no conflict in result reached whether laws
of C a l i f o r n i a or A r i z o n a w e r e applied
2

D e a t h <®==>8

Generally
damages
recovered
for
w r o n g f u l death w h e t h e r b> action settle
m e n t or c o m p r o m i s e are to be distributed
a p p o r t i o n e d or disposed of in accordance
w i t h provisions of law o t state under
whose sta f *tfx n g h t fn ret o v e r v accrued i
e , o r d i n a r i l y , the law of the place where
the d e a t h causing m j u r v occurred as dib
tinguished i r o m t h e law of decedent s dom
lcile

3 Statutes <§=205, 223.1
In i n t e r p r e t i n g s t a t u t e s and p a r t s of
statutes, consistency is of p r i m e impor
utuce, c o u r t s must h a r m o n i z e and reconcile laws a n d adopt construction w h i c h will
achieve same
4 Executors and Administrators <£=527l
Intent of legislature in e n a c t i n g stat
ute prohibiting r e c o v e r y in a wrongful
death action from b e i n g subject to debts or
liabilities of deceased unless action is
brought on behalf of decedent's estate was
to give t h e parties injured fair and mst
damages resulting from tht.
wrongful
death A R S § 12-613
5 Death <§=>I0I
S t a t u t o r y provision requiring distnbu
tion of w r o n g f u l death proceeds according
to laws of intestacy applies only when ac
t on is b r o u g h t on behalf of estate
ARS
§ 12 612 [ C ]
6 Death <§=>I0I
Proceeds of settlement made by de
ceased's wife on behalf of herself and mi
nor child in w r o n g f u l death action were to
be distributed to wife and child in propor
tion to t h e i r damages, r a t h e r t h a n in equal
proportions
A R S § 12-612 [ L ]

Miller, P i t t & F e l d m a n , P C , by Stanley
G Feldman, Tucson, for petitioner
Browning, D r u k e & H a w k i n s , by Carol
Wilson D r u k e , Tucson, for respondent
guardian
OPINION
H O W A R D , Judge
A. superior court order distributing
proceeds of a w r o n g f u l death settlemen
the subject of this special action We
of the opinion that, despite the existence
t remedy by appeal, our obligation "to
tnat essential justice is d o n e " warrant^
tervention by way ot special action
Caruso v S u p e r i o r Court, 100 Ariz
412 P 2d 463 (1966)

Ariz
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w u. v i jijwvxi,
Cite as 521 P 2d 636
T h e undisputed facts a r e as
ciary and at the conclusion of the h e a r i n g ,
Petitioner is the s u r v i v i n g spouse offollows
Lawr
the court found t h a t t h e m i n o r b e n e f i c i a r y
ence L o m b a r d o w h o died on F e b r u a r y 19
was damaged in the sum of $64,500 a n d
1969 L a w r e n c e D L o m b a r d o , a m i n o r is
the d a m a g e s to the s u r v i v i n g spouse w e r e
the only s u r v i v i n g child
Decedent was a
$150,500
T h e court, h o w e v e r c o n c l u d e d
resident of and w a s domiciled m the S t a t e
t h a t u n d e r A R S § 1 2 - 6 1 2 ( C ) the settle
of California, as w e r e his spouse a n d child
ment proceeds should be d i s t r i b u t e d in ac
\t the time of his death, he w a s a n em
cordance with the law of i n t e s t a t e succe^
ployee of the G r e y h o u n d B u s L i n e but was
sion of California, the d e c e d e n t ' s domicile
present in the S t a t e of A r i z o n a for the
Since u n d e r California law the p e r s o n a l es
sole purpose of receiving medical t r e a t m e n t
tate of a person d y i n g i n t e s t a t e is d i s t r i b
at the Southern Pacific M e m o r i a l H o s p i t a l ,
uted one half to the s u r v i v i n g spouse a n d
having been r e f e r r e d t h e r e from
the
one half to the s u r v i v i n g child, t h e c o u r t
Southern Pacific E m p l o y e e s ' Clinic in Los
o
r d e r e d petitioner to d i s t r i b u t e $107,500 to
Angeles
herself and $107 500 to the m i n o r ' s g u a r d i
After her h u s b a n d ' s death, p e t i t i o n e r (on
an
Dehalf of herself and the m i n o r child) filed
Petitioner contends t h a t since u n d e r t h e
a wrongful death action against S o u t h e r n
California statute a w r o n g f u l d e a t h r e c o v
Pacific Memorial Hospital I n c , and a
ery is not distributable a c c o r d i n g to t h e
Tucson doctor, alleging negligence on the
laws of intestate succession but r a t h e r ac
part of the d e f e n d a n t s
T h e action was
c o r d i n g to the p e c u n i a r y loss of each bene
scheduled for trial in J u n e , 1972, a n d on
ficiary see C h a n g a n s \ M a r v e l , 231 Cal
the day before trial petitioner entered into
A p p 2 d 308, 41 C a l R p t r 774 (1964)
I n re
a settlement a g r e e m e n t with the d e f e n d a n t s
Riccomi's Estate, 185 Cal 458, 197 P 97
whereby the d e f e n d a n t s a g r e e d to pay
(1921), the subject distribution should also
$215 000 m settlement of all claims of all
h a v e been apportioned a c c o r d i n g to t h e re
persons entitled to s h a r e in the r e c o v e r y ot
spective losses of t h e beneficiaries w h i c h
damages for the death of M r L o m b a r d o
Pursuant to court instructions and a p p r o \
the lower court found to be 7 0 % - 3 0 %
al petitioner accepted the $215,000 in full
[1J A l t h o u g h we a g r e e w i t h the peti
ettlement of all claims and a h e a r i n g w a s
tioner as to the recovery ratio, w e find n o
onducted relative to distribution of said
reason to look to the California w r o n g f u l
urn (Respondent Pollock w a s appointed
death statute to d e t e r m i n e d i s t r i b u t i o n of
uardian of the estate of the minor ) P e
the wrongful death proceeds 1 b e c a u s e
r
oner requested that the d a m a g e s be dis
there
is no conflict between the result w e
iDuted m accordance with the actual loss
reach and the result if the C a l i f o r n i a stat
stained by each of the beneficiaries enti
utc w e r e applied
i to share in the d a m a g e settlement a n d
at the court determine and divide the set
[2J I t is the general rule t h a t d a m a g e
ment proceeds in accordance with such
recovered for wrongful death, w h e t h e r b>
tual loss
action, settlement or compromise, a r e to be
distributed apportioned, or disposed of in
Evidence was presented to the court as
accordance with the provisions of t h e l a w
the actual loss sustained by each benefi
of the state under whose s t a t u t e the r i g h t
tn support of her position petitioner relies
n
§ 175 of the Restatement f *i L Law See
stited in § 6 to the occurrence and the par
J
il < onfi ts of Laws
fits n which event the local law of the other
state will be applied
In an iction for a wrongful death the
Section 177 provides
weal law of the state where the injury oe
curred determines the rights md liabilities
The more selected by application of the
of
rule of § 175 determines how the recovery
the parties unless with respect to the par
in
an
action for wrongful death shall be dis
"cular issue some other state has the more
tributed '
^gmficant relationship under the principles
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provisions for distribution in the case
to recovery accrued, 1 e ordinarily the law
when designated beneficiaries survive"
2 Ariz App at 194, 407 P2d at 133
of the place where the death causing mju
Arizona's first wrongful death statute
ry occurred, as distinguished from the law
was enacted lr 1887, Rev Stat Ariz §§
of the decedent's domicile Cherokee Lab
oratories, Inc v Rogers, 398 P 2d 520 2145-2155, essentially following the format
of Lord Campbell's Act To recover, it
(Okll965), see Annot 92 A L R 2 d 1129
was necessary to allege and prove the exis
A R S § 12-613 provides the measure of
tence of survivors and the amount of inju
damages in an action for wrongful death
nes sustained by them Southern Pacific
"
the jury shall give such dam
Company v Wilson, 10 Ariz 162, 85 P
ages as it deems fair and just with refer
ence to the injury resulting from the death 401 (1906) The Revised Statutes of 1901,
Rev Stat Ariz Civ Code §§ 2764-2767, sub'
to the surviving parties who may be enti
tied to recover,
" This statute stantially changed the nature of the earlier
also protects the recovery from creditors' Act An action was created for the bene
claims unless the wrongful death action is fit of the decedent's estate, and the dam
ages recoverable were distributed as assets
brought on behalf of the decedent's estate
of the estate according to the laws of m
A R S § 12-612 as it read at the time of
testacy
Southern Pacific Company v
decedent's death, provides in pertinent
Wilson supra The 1901 Act was subse
part
quently adopted with minor modifications
"A An action for wrongful death
in 1913 1928, and 1939 In 1956, the Act
shall be brought by and in the name of
was changed and provided a right of re
the surviving husband or wife or person
covery for the decedent's surviving spouse
al representative of the deceased person
children or parents and if none survived
recovery on behalf of the decedent's estate
for and on behalf of the surviving hus
Although it provided for assessment of
band or wife, children or parents, or if
damages according to the loss sustained by
none of these survive, on behalf of the
the statutory beneficiaries, the old provi
decedent's estate
sion for distribution which was adopted in
*
*
*
*
*
*
1901 when the action was for the benefit
C The amount recovered in an ac
of the decedent's estate, remained
tion for wrongful death shall be distrib
uted to the parties provided for in
[3-5] In interpreting statutes and parts
subsection A and in the proportions pro
of statutes consistency is of prime impor
vided by law for distribution of personal tance—courts must harmonize and recon
estate left by persons dying intestate" cile laws and adopt the construction wind1
In Salinas v Kahn, 2 Ariz App 181, 407 will achieve this The intent of the legis
P2d 120 (1965), rehearing denied 2 Ariz
lature in A R S § 12-613 was to give the
App 348, 409 P 2 d 64 (1966)* we indicat
parties injured fair and just damages re
suiting from the wrongful death, as evi
ed that the provision regarding distribution
denced by the provision that such recovery
according to the laws of intestacy is con
shall not be subject to the debts or liabilitrolling only when the action is brought
ties of the deceased unless the action i£
for the benefit of the estate We stated
'
It seems to this court it may brought on behalf of the decedent's estate
We therefore hold that A R S § 12-6l2(<j3
very well be argued that there is an ob
applies only when the action is brought 01
vious inconsistency between the new pro
visions for the assessment of damages behalf of the estate This is a common
[A R S § 12-613] and the old provisions sense interpretation of legislative mtenl
for the distribution of damages and that and harmonizes § 12-612(C) (1956) with
the 1956 Act implicitly amended the old
„ denied Dy the Arizona Supreme Court February 16,1966
2 Review was denied oy

Cite as 521 P 2d 636

12-613, which provides that the damages to
the injured parties 'shall be fair and just
to the surviving parties who may
be entitled to recovery " Otherwise, there
could be parties who were not injured re
ceiving damages when they sustained no
pecuniary loss As was stated at 14 A L R
p 522
"
If the purpose of the statute
that the damages shall be assessed in
view of the pecuniary loss to the individ
uals is taken into consideration, it would
seem that the reference to the statutes of
distribution as the mode of determining
the apportionment of the verdict should
be construed as being merely for the
purpose of ascertaining the classes of
persons who may be entitled to partici
pate, and the manner of distribution
when not influenced by any considera
tion of pecuniary loss to particular bene
ficianes, and not as intending absolutely
to control with regard to the amount
each of the distributees shall receive
when considered in connection with the
pecuniary loss suffered
by them
We find nothing in Lueck v Superior
Court, County of Cochise, 105 Ariz 583,
469 P2d 68 (1970) which mandates a con
trary holding 3 In Lueck, the sole issue
was whether parents of a decedent could
recover when there also survived a wife
and children The Court relied on Ian
guage from the case of In Re Venneman's
Estate, 286 Mich 368, 282 N W 180
(1938) to the effect that the wisdom of a
statute is not a matter for judicial consid
eration but is wholly within the control of
the legislature The Court then held that
since parents would take nothing by mtes
tate succession if a wife and children survive, parents had no right to recover m a
wrongful death action
3

We recognize that there are statements in
Lueck which are contrary to our holding in
the case at bench, such statements are mere

In 1973, the legislature amended A R S
§ 12-612(C) to expressly state what we
herein hold
"C The amount recovered in an ac
tion for wrongful death shall be distrib
uted to the parties provided for m
subsection A in proportion to their damages, and if recovery is on behalf of the
decedent's estate the amount shall be an
asset of the estate "
It is not inappropriate for this court to
look to subsequent changes of the law in
support of its own views of the prior act
General Petroleum Corporation of California v Smith, 62 Ariz 239, 157 P 2d 356
(1945), Neil B McGumnis Equipment
Company v Henson, 2 Ariz App 59, 406
P2d 409 (1965) As stated in the case of
City of Mesa v Kilhngsworth, 96 Ariz
290, 394 P 2d 410 (1964)
'
The legislature has now
clearly expressed its intention consistent
with the construction which we believe
should be placed on the former statutes
An amendment which, in effect, con
strues and clarifies a prior statute will
be accepted as the legislative declaration
of the original act [citation omitted]"
96 Ariz at 297, 394 P 2d at 414
[6] We hold, therefore, that the
$215,000 is to be distributed to the petitioner and the minor child in proportion to
their damages, I e 70% to petitioner and
30% to the guardian of the estate of the
minor child
The subject order of distribution is va
cated with directions to enter an appropriate order not inconsistent herewith
HATHAWAY, C J , and KRUCKER,
J , concur
ly obiter dicta and not binding precedent
Hernandez v County of Yuma 91 Ariz 35,
369 P2d 271 (1962)
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goes without saying that had the mother
given advance notice, the father's visitation
privileges could have been accordingly modified. But when the mother left without
first getting the decree modified as to visitation, she forced the father's hand. The
only meaningful option he had was to force
the issue by seeking a change in custody.
Although he was not successful, he at least
obtained a change in visitation to reflect
the changed geographical distance between
himself and his daughter. The trial court
ordered that the father have custody for six
weeks every summer, during alternate
Christmas and Easter holidays and at other
times convenient to the father and which
would not interfere with the schooling or
other activities of the child.
[2,3] District courts have the means to
compel compliance with their orders concerning removal of children from the state.
A trial court may assert continued power
over domestic matters by requiring a bond
conditioned upon a party's compliance with
the court order. See Grimditch v. Grimditch (1951), 71 Ariz. 237, 226 P.2d 142 (permitting, under the facts, removal without
bond); Wallace v. Wallace (1932), 92 Mont.
489, 15 P.2d 915, 918 (security can be required to enforce an alimony decree). The
trial court may also hold in contempt a
parent who violates an order to secure court
approval before removing a child from the
state. Ex Parte Sellers (1948), 250 Ala. 87,
33 So.2d 349; Benson v. Benson (1948), 121
Mont. 439, 193 P.2d 827, 829 (dictum); see
also Kramer v. Kramer (1978), 176 Mont.
362, 578 P.2d 317, 318. We suggest that the
trial court, in appropriate cases, employ
these alternatives.
[4] The mother contends that this appeal is frivolous and asks us to assess a
penalty against the father pursuant to Rule
32, M.R.App.Civ.R, or, alternatively, to
award her attorney fees pursuant to section
40—4-110, MCA, because she cannot afford
to pay her own attorney. She did not make
this request at the trial level, and we are
not inclined to act favorably on this request
here. We cannot ignore the fact that it
was the mother who moved to North Caroli-

na without first getting a change in the
visitation privileges, and thus forced the
father to initiate the present litigation. Essentially, he had no other choice. Under
the circumstances, the mother is not in an
equitable position to argue that the father
should pay her attorney fees.
The order refusing to grant custody to
the father is affirmed.
HASWELL, C. J., and DALY, HARRISON and SHEEHY, JJ., concur.
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In the Matter of the ESTATE of
Herman G. MERKEL, Deceased.
No. 80-53.

MATTER OF ESTATE OF MERKEL
1. Constitutional Law to 225.5
Wills to 779
Classification embodied in statute governing a surviving spouse's right of election,
pursuant to which a competent spouse is
not restricted in making the election while
a protected spouse must show need before
claiming the benefit of an election, did not
involve a fundamental right or suspect class
and, therefore, statute could survive equal
protection challenge provided that the classification was reasonable and not arbitrary
and rested on some difference having a fair
and substantial relation to the statutory
purpose. MCA 72-2-703; U.S.CA.Const.
Amend. 14.
2. Constitutional Law to 48(4)
Party who alleges that a statutory classification violates equal protection has burden to prove that the classification is arbitrary. U.S.CA.Const. Amend. 14.

Supreme Court of Montana.
Submitted Sept. 11, 1980.
Decided Oct. 27, 1980.
Personal representative of decedent's
estate appealed from an order of the District Court, Eighteenth Judicial District,
Gallatin County, Joseph Gary, J., which dismissed a petition for allowance of claims on
behalf of the estate. 'The Supreme Court,
Haswell, C. J., held that: (1) the statute
which requires a showing of need in order
for a protected spouse to claim an elective
share in his or her late spouse's estate but
which does not impose any such restriction
on a competent spouse did not violate the
equal protection clauses of the Federal or
Montana Constitutions; (2) the sections
which provide for a homestead allowance
and exempt property contemplate estates in
fee and not life estates only; and (3) by
surviving her late husband for more than
120 hours, widow and her estate became
absolutely entitled to a fee interest in the
homestead allowance and exempt property
Affirmed in part, reversed in part and
remanded.

Mont. 873

Cite as, Mont, 618 P.2d 872

3. Wills «=> 779
Primary purpose of the elective share
statutes is to insure that a surviving
spouse's needs are met and that the spouse
is not left penniless. MCA 72-2-703.
4. Constitutional Law to 225.5
Wills to 779
The statute which requires a showing
of need in order for a protected spouse to
claim an elective share against his or her
deceased spouse's estate but which does not
impose such requirement on a competent
spouse was reasonable and not arbitrary
when considered in light of the court's traditional role with respect to incompetent
persons and of the statutory purpose to
insure that surviving spouses' needs are met
and, therefore, statute did not violate the
equal protection clauses of the Federal or
the Montana Constitutions. MCA 72-2703; Const. Art. 2, § 4; U.S.CA.Const.
Amend. 14.
5. Executors and Administrators to 173
The primary purpose of the homestead
allowance is to protect the decedent's family. MCA 72-2-801, 72-2-802.

6. Executors and Administrators to 180
The statutes which create a homestead
allowance and a surviving spouse's entitlement to value not exceeding $3,500 from
the deceased spouse's estate contemplate an
interest which does not terminate at the
surviving spouse's death, so long as the
spouse survives the decedent for the required 120 hours. MCA 72-2-205, 72-2801, 72-2-802.
7. Executors and Administrators «s=»174
Where, though the statutes creating
the homestead allowance and exempt property continued the tradition of making statutory rights available to a surviving spouse,
the legislature chose not to identify either
of these interests as life estates and where
the former homestead provision explicitly
indicated that the homestead was a life
estate only, it was proper to assume that
the legislature deliberately omitted the "life
estate" limitation and the Supreme Court
would not imply that limitation. MCA 722-801, 72-2-802; R.CM.1947, § 91-2405
(Repealed).
8. Executors and Administrators <&=>181
The statutory homestead allowance is
no longer an interest just in land but is an
allowance which may be satisfied in any
type of property. MCA 72-2-801.
9. Internal Revenue to 1008.1
Legislative intent was that the homestead allowance and the exempt property
allowance qualify for the marital deduction
under federal estate tax law. MCA 7 2 - 1 102, 72-2-803; 26 U.S.CA. (I.R.C1954)
§ 2056.
10. Executors and Administrators <3=>180
Where widow survived her husband for
at least 120 hours, widow and her estate
became absolutely entitled to a fee interest
in the homestead allowance and in statutorily exempt property. MCA 72-2-801, 722-802.
Steven D. Nelson argued, Bozeman, for
appellant.
Moore, Rice, O'Connell & Refling, Perry
J. Moore argued, Bozeman, for respondent.
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HASWELL, Chief Justice.
The personal representative of the Estate
of Celia J. Merkel appeals from an order
entered in the District Court, Eighteenth
Judicial District, dismissing a petition for
allowance of claims on behalf of the estate
of Celia J. Merkel. In his ruling, the district judge denied the claims for the homestead allowance, exempt property, and an
elective share. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
The facts giving rise to this decision are
important, particularly with respect to the
time sequence involved. In 1967, Herman
G. Merkel and Celia J. Merkel married, both
of them over 70 years old at the time. In
October 1977, Sterling Hunter was appointed guardian of Celia Merkel by a Montana
court. Herman Merkel died in December
1978, having executed a will earlier which
left nothing to his wife Celia. On June 4,
1979, Celia Merkel, through her guardian,
filed a claim for exempt property and
homestead allowance, and filed a petition
for an elective share. Celia died 9 days
later on June 13, 1979.
On August 6, 1979, Sterling Hunter, the
personal representative of the estate of Celia J. Merkel, filed a petition for allowance
of the same claims on behalf of the estate
of Celia Merkel. The personal representative of Herman Merkel's estate moved to
dismiss the petition, asserting that Celia's
failure to survive extinguished her claims,
and that her estate had no valid claims.
The district judge granted the motion, ruling that the homestead allowance and exempt property were life estates only. The
district judge also denied Celia Merkel's
petition for an elective share, because a
court order had not been entered in which a
finding was made that the election was
necessary to support Celia Merkel as a protected person.
The appellant brings two issues before
this Court:
(1) Whether section 72-2-703, MCA, requiring a showing of need in order for a
protected spouse to claim an elective share,
is violative of the equal protection clauses
of the United States Constitution and the
Montana Constitution?

(2) Whether sections 72-2-801 and 72-2802, MCA, providing for a homestead allowance and exempt property, contemplate life
estates only or rather estates in fee for
which a surviving spouse's estate can bring
claim?
[1] Appellant's first contention is that
section 72-2-703 is unconstitutional. That
statute describes who may exercise the
right of election:
"Right of election personal to surviving
spouse. The right of election of the surviving spouse may be exercised only by
him. In the case of a protected person,
the right of election may be exercised
only by order of the court in which protective proceedings as to his property are
pending after finding that exercise is necessary to provide adequate support for
the protected person during his probable
life expectancy."
As the statute indicates, a competent
spouse is not restricted in any way in making the election, but a protected spouse has
to pass the hurdle of showing need before
claiming the possible benefits of an election.
Clearly, the statute sets up a classification-a classification which appellant contends denies equal protection to protected
spouses.
The legislature is empowered to classify
persons for purposes of legislation, State v.
Craig (1976), 169 Mont. 150, 156, 545 P.2d
649, 653, and in reviewing a statute, this
Court presumes that the statute is constitu^
tional. Great Falls Nat. Bk. v. McCormid
(1968), 152 Mont. 319, 323, 448 P.2d 991, 993!
Appellant admits that this classification
does not involve a "fundamental right" or a
"suspect class", which would require a finding by this Court of a compelling state
interest in order to uphold the class. State
v. Jack (1975), 167 Mont. 456, 461, 539 R2d
726, 729. Rather, this Court need only . d |
termine that the " 'classification [is] reason
able, not arbitrary, and must rest upor
some ground of difference having a fair anc
substantial relation to the object of.itto
legislation, so that all persons similarly cir
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cumstanced shall be treated a l i k e . . . ' "
State v. Craig, supra, 169 Mont, at 156, 545
P.2d at 653.
[2] The appellant has the burden of
proving that the classification is arbitrary,
State v. Jack, supra, 167 Mont, at 461, 539
P.2d at 729, a burden which appellant has
not sustained here.
We note at the outset that the State
legislatures have traditionally set apart the
class which is involved here, delegating the
care of incompetent persons to the State.
The Colorado Supreme Court stated in the
early case of Shapter v. Pillar (1900), 28
Colo. 209, 63 P. 302, 304, "It falls to the
State to take care of those who, by reason
of mental incapacity, cannot take care of
themselves."

Mont. 875

This statute clearly deprives the incompetent spouse of a choice, and further deprives the incompetent of any excess property to pass on to heirs, to invest, or to use
for unnecessaries.
However, providing
funds for these purposes is not the primary
aim of the statute and is merely an incidental benefit, available only if the decedent's
estate happens to be large enough to allow
these extras.
By being subject to a protective order,
the incompetent has already been deprived
of the right to make choices in regard to
property. Additionally, the court has before it, by virtue of the protective proceedings, all of the information necessary to
determine what is in the best interests of
the protected spouse. The statute insures
that the spouse will be adequately cared
for, thus fulfilling the ultimate purpose of
the statute, while denying the spouse only
the discretionary income.

This tradition of delegating care of incompetent persons to the State was the
basis of a recent Colorado Supreme Court
decision which upheld the constitutionality
of the Colorado code section which corre[4] We find this statute to be reasonable
sponds to section 72-2-703, MCA. See
and
not arbitrary when considered in light
Sweeney v. Summers (1977), 194 Colo. 149,
571 P.2d 1067. That court noted that the of the traditional role of the court with
entire statutory scheme pertaining to in- respect to incompetent persons and when
competent persons has placed their care ul- considered in light of the purpose of the
timately with the State. Sweeney, supra, statute. The district judge acted properly
in denying the petition for an elective
571 P.2d at 1069. See sections 72-5-401 et
share.
seq., MCA. Additionally, pre-Uniform Probate Code law in most states gave to a
The second issue which appellant brings
court of competent jurisdiction the respon- before this Court involves a determination
sibility for making the decision of whether of the nature of the interest created by the
or not the incompetent spouse should elect homestead allowance and exempt property
against the decedent's will, 80 Am.Jur.2d statutes. Those statutes provide in part:
Wills §§ 1614-1615, Annot., 3 A.L.R.3d 6,
"Homestead allowance. (1) A surviving
§ 3, a decision which was based primarily on
spouse of a decedent who was domiciled
the needs of the incompetent spouse.
in this state is entitled to a homestead
allowance of $20,000.
[3] The primary purpose of the elective
share statutes is to insure that the surviving spouse's needs are met, and that the
"(2) The homestead allowance is exempt
spouse is not left penniless. Annot, 3 A.L.
from and has priority over all claims
R.3d 6, § 3. Presumably, in making the
against the estate.
decision whether to elect or not, the compe"(3) Homestead allowance is in addition
tent spouse would consider many factors,
to any share passing to the surviving
with need being the most persuasive. Bespouse or minor or dependent child by the
cause of the statute in question, the court is
will of the decedent unless otherwise prorequired to make the election decision for
vided, by intestate succession, or by way
the incompetent solely on the basis of need.
of elective share." Section 72-2-801,
Section 72-2-703, MCA.
MCA.
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331 S.W.2d 552. The Missouri court dis"Exempt property. (1) In addition to the cussed the origins of the homestead, noting
homestead allowance, the surviving that neither the former homestead nor dowspouse of a decedent who was domiciled er survived the death of the surviving
in this state is entitled from the estate to spouse. The object of the homestead to
value not exceeding $3,500. . . " Section protect the family would not "be served by
72-2-802, MCA.
the payment of the homestead allowance to
Neither of the statutes indicates what the estate of a surviving spouse." Schubel,
type of interest is created, i. e., whether it is 331 S.W.2d at 554, supra.
a fee interest in the surviving spouse, or a
[5,6] This Court agrees with the district
life estate only which is extinguished by the
judge
that the primary purpose of the
spouse's death. Celia Merkel attempted to
claim these benefits as a surviving spouse, homestead allowance and exempt property
but she died before receiving them. Appel- is to protect the family of the decedent.
lant contends that Celia Merkel's estate is However, we find that sections 72-2-801
entitled to these benefits because she was a and 72-2-802, MCA, giving these rights to
surviving spouse at the time she attempted a surviving spouse, contemplate an interest
which does not terminate at the surviving
to claim them.
spouse's death, so long as the spouse surThe courts of other states which have
vives the decedent for the required 120
enacted the Uniform Probate Code (UPC)
hours, section 72-2-205, MCA.
have not considered this question, nor do
Appellant argues that the 120-hour prothe Commission comments specifically address this issue. Pre-code law in Montana vision in itself establishes a fee interest in a
indicates that the homestead was a life surviving spouse, and that by surviving
estate only. The purpose of the homestead Herman Merkel for nearly six months, Celia
was to preserve the fee interest for the Merkel's estate was entitled to these beneheirs of the decedent, while setting aside a fits. Section 72-2-205, MCA, provides in
life estate, safe from creditors, for the part:
spouse and family of the decedent. Kerlee
"Requirement that heir survive decedent
v. Smith (1912), 46 Mont. 19, 22, 124 P. 777;
by one hundred twenty hours. Any per40 Am.Jur.2d, Homestead, § 4. The early
son who fails to survive the decedent by
cases, however, were based on a Montana
120 hours is deemed to have predeceased
statute which specifically mandated that
the decedent for purposes of homestead
the homestead was a life estate, a statute
allowance, exempt property, and intesthat was repealed with the adoption of the
tate succession, and the decedent's heirs
UPC:
are determined accordingly
"
" . . If the property set apart be a homeCelia Merkel clearly qualifies as a survivstead, selected from the separate proper- ing spouse under this statute, but this statty of the deceased, the court or judge can ute does not define the nature of the interonly set it apart for a limited period, to est created in the survivor, as to whether it
be designated in the order, which shall be is terminated upon the survivor's death.
a life estate to husband or wife, and the
[7] Although the homestead allowance
title vests in the heirs of the deceased, and exempt property continue the tradition
subject to such order." Section 91-2405, of making statutory rights available to a
R.C.M.1947. (Emphasis added.)
surviving spouse, the Montana legislature
In determining that the two new inter- chose not to identify either of these interests created by the UPC were intended to ests as life estates. Since this was explicit
be life estates, the district judge relied on in the language of section 91-2405, R.C.M.
this traditional view of the homestead, and
1947, the former homestead provision, we
on a 1960 Missouri case, interpreting the
assume that the legislature purposely omitMissouri Homestead Allowance Statute (not
ted the "life estate" limitation and we will
UPC). See Schubel v. Bonacker (Mo.1960),
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not imply it. See C. Sands, Sutherland the marital deduction under the Federal
Statutory Construction, § 45.12 (4th ed. Estate Tax Act because the interest is terminable." This is the only statute in the
1972). In so construing the statute, we rely
"Family Protection" section of the UPC
on the rule of statutory construction which
with such a provision. This omission improvides:
plies that the homestead allowance and ex"[W]hen a statute is revised, some part
empt property were meant to qualify for
being omitted, the omitted parts are not
the marital deduction. If so, the interests
readily to be supplied by construction, but
created cannot be terminable interests. See
are ordinarily to be construed as ansection 2056, I.R.C. (1954).
nulled." State v. Richardson (1953), 174
In 1979 the legislature of Nebraska added
Kan. 382, 256 P.2d 135, 139.
The new statutes appear clear on their face. a provision to its version of the UPC in
The respondent has not brought before the order to assure that the homestead allowCourt sufficient evidence to overcome the ance and exempt property would qualify for
presumption that in passing new legislation, the marital deduction. See § 30-2325,
the legislature intended to make a change R.S.N. 1943, reissue of 1979, which provides
in existing law. Mont. Dept. of Rev. v. Am. in part that
"[t]he homestead allowance, the exempt
Smelting & Refining (1977), 173 Mont. 316,
property
shall vest in the surviving
325, 567 P.2d 901, 906.
spouse as of the date of decedent's death,
[8] The appellant raises other arguas a vested indefeasible right of property,
ments which indicate to this Court that the
shall survive as an asset of the surviving
drafters of the UPC did not intend to limit
spouse's estate if unpaid on the death of
these interests to life estates. The present
such surviving spouse, and shall not terhomestead allowance is no longer an interminate upon the death or remarriage of
est just in land, but is an allowance which
the surviving spouse."
may be satisfied in any type of property.
[10] We find that such a provision is not
Terming these interests life estates would
appear to undercut one of the expressed necessary. It appears clear to us from the
purposes of the UPC, that is "to simplify wording of the statute itself, as well as
the law concerning the affairs of dece- from the expressed purposes of the UPC,
dents." Section 72-1-102, MCA. Court in- that the drafters intended that the survivvolvement could drag on for years in order ing spouse should take a fee interest in the
to insure the transfer of the property to the homestead allowance and exempt property.
remaindermen, and the courts could be By surviving the decedent for 120 hours,
called upon to hear suits for waste against Celia Merkel and her estate became entitled
the life tenant. Too, with the possibility of to those benefits absolutely. The district
satisfying the statutory allowance in money judge erred in denying those claims on beor personal property, the courts would be in half of Celia Merkel's estate.
a position of having to determine the use
This case is remanded to the District
which a life tenant could make of the prop- Court for entry of judgment in accordance
erty. See 51 Am.Jur.2d, Life Tenants, with this opinion.
§§ 34-36.
SHEA
and
[9] One other point merits attention.
DALY,
HARRISON,
The provision in the Uniform Probate Code SHEEHY, JJ , concur.
providing for a Family allowance specifically states that "the death of any person
entitled to family allowance terminates his
KEYNUMBERSYSTEM
w5>
right to allowances not yet paid." Section
72-2-803, MCA. The comments to that
section provide that " . the allowance
provided by this section does not qualify for

776

Idaho

OIMMUJNS v. EWING
Cite as 529 p 2d 770

529 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES

The question then becomes Does the
record support the Industrial Commission's
findings that Clay left his employment voluntarily without good cause ? The Industrial Commission made the following
finding of fact in this regard
FINDING OF FACT II
"
When he [Clay] was employed in 1971, he discussed with the employer the possibility of devoting some
of his time to research and development
at the employer's shop
No specific
agreement was reached, but the employer
acknowledged the possibility that arrangements could be made eventually so
that the claimant could spend part of his
time on research and continue to receive
his regular salary
" (Tr pp
18-19)
Based upon this and other findings of fact,
the Industrial Commission made the fol
lowing conclusion of law
CONCLUSION OF LAW II

mitted into testimony received before the
appeals examiner" And while this Court
1S not bound by the view of the testimony
taken by the Industrial Commission where
they have not observed the witnesses themselves but are merely reviewing the record
of the appeals examiner, Phipps v Boise
Street Car Co , 61 Idaho 740, 107 P2d 148
(1940), nevertheless, considering the testimony given before the appeals examiner
there is substantial, competent evidence to
support both his conclusion that Clay had
no specific agreement with Crooks about
doing research and development work and
thus left work without good cause, and the
Industrial Commission's affirmance of the*
appeals examiner's conclusion According
ly where there is substantial evidence id
support it, the finding of the Industrial
Commission and the order based upon ft
will not be disturbed on appeal Levesqu?
v Hi Boy Meats, Inc , 95 Idaho 808, 52C
P2d 549 (1974)
*"l
Order affirmed

^

SHEPARD, C J , and DONALDSONJ
McQUADE and McFADDEN, JJ , concuB

"
The claimant and the employer never had a definite agreement to the
effect that the claimant would eventually
be allowed to do research and develop
ment work
[T]he failure to
arrive at such an agreement did not con
stitute a breach of the employment
96 Idaho 380
agreement by the employer,
Betty SIMMONS, Personal representative
[and] the claimant's reason for leaving
the Estate of Irene H Ewing, De
his employment was not of such a comceased, Plaintiff-Appellant,
pelling nature as to cause a reasonable
v.
person to voluntarily choose to become
Thomas G EWING, Surviving Spouse
unemployed" (Tr p 20)
Defendant-Respondent
[2, 3] This finding of fact and conclu
No 11627
sion of law cannot be upheld as supported
bupreme Court of Idaho
by substantial, competent evidence if only
Dec 20, 1974
Clay's live testimony before the commission is considered However, I C § 721368(g) provides that when the commission
Proceeding on personal repres<
is hearing appeals from the Department of
tives' application for informal p j
Employment appeals examiner that "[t]he The District Court, Second JudiaalJ
record of the proceedings before the ap- trict, Nez Perce County, John H Max
peals examiner shall become part of the J entered orders which granted home
record of the proceedings
before and exempt property allowances to ft)
the board with respect to the evidence ad-

ing spouse from deceised's separate property, and plaintiff appealed The Supreme
Court, Donaldson, J , held that statutes in
volved were not void for vagueness that
awards did not defeat intention of testa
trix, and that allowances were properly
granted
Affirmed
I. Wills ©=782(10, 13)

Grant of homestead and exempt property allowances to surviving spouse from
deceased's separate property was not objec
tionable as defeating intentions of testatrix
who executed will which was drafted with
aid of an attorney after effective date of
Uniform Probate Code but failed to include a clause in such manner as to require
surviving spouse to elect between benefits
of statutory allowances and whatever
rights may accrue under provisions of will
I C §§ 15-2-206(b), 15-2-401, 15-2-402
2 Statutes <S==47
Two sections of Code under which
homestead and exempt property allowances
were made were not invilid for vagueness
and uncertainty because of dual use of
"homestead" in Uniform Probate Code
homestead allowance and homestead e\
emption from execution found in statutory
scheme Const art 1, § 16 art 3, § 17
I C §§ 15-2-401,55-1001 et seq
3 Statutes €=47
« Homestead allowance provision in
Uniform Probate Code is not invalid for
vagueness on ground that Code does not
specify property from which allowance is
to be taken first Const art 1, § 16 art
3, § 17 I C §§ 15-2-401, 55-1001 et seq
4 Executors and Administrators C=> 181
.
Under will which bequeathed all of de
cedent's community property to surviving
spouse, and only separate property re
gained, separate property was sole source
lor funds for homestead allowance to sur
vivmg spouse Const art 1, § 16 art 3,
§17, I C §§ 15-2-401, 55-1001 et seq
5. Wills <£=58(2)
jL A contract to make a will requires a
Rowing of such by clear and convincing
evidence
529 P 2d—49Vz
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6 Constitutional Law <§=>I54(1)

In the absence of clear and convincing
evidence of contract to make a will, argument that Ijinform Probate Code impaired
obligation of contract failed Const art 1,
§ 16 art 3, § 17 I C §§ 15-2-401, 551001 et seq
7 W i l l s @=3|

The right to dispose of property bv
will is in no sense a property right or a
so called natural right
8 Appeal and Error <§=>756

Appellant's failure to offer authority
for position taken precluded Supreme
Court from considering assignment of error Supreme Court Rules, rule 41
9 Appeal and Error <@=»878(l)

Issue not before Supreme Court by
proper cross appeal would not be consid
ered
10 Executors and Administrators <S=> 181
Exempt property and homestead allow
ances were properly awarded to surviving
spouse with funds for allowances being
taken from deceased's separate property
I C §§ 15-2-206(b), 15-2-401, 15-2-402,
55-1001 et seq Const art 1 § 16 art 3,
§ 17

Joseph C Adams, J r ,
plaintiff appellant

Lewiston,

for

Leslie T McCarthy, Lewiston, for de
fendant respondent
DONALDSON, Justice
This appeal places in issue the propriety
of exempt property and homestead allow
ances being awarded by the district court
to the surviving spouse, with funds for the
allowances being taken from deceased's
separate property Tor the reasons stated
in this opinion, the orders of the district
court are affirmed
Irene H Ewing, the decedent, died February 23, 1973, at which time she was dom
lciled in Nez Perce County, Idaho
She
had executed a will dated January 24, 1973,
in which she bequeathed her community
property to her husband, Thomas G Ew

GARNER v. CRA1 ER FAKMS, INC
I d a h o
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ing, the respondent, and her separate property to her two daughters from a previous
marriage, Donna Alexander and Betty
Simmons Ms Simmons, whom the decedent also nominated as Executrix, is the
appellant in this action as personal representative
In that capacity she filed her
application for informal probate on March
7, 1973
As a result of proceedings in the probate
of the estate, the respondent was granted
from decedent's separate property a $4,000
homestead allowance (less $1,463 he had
previously collected from a joint checking
account) pursuant to I C § 15-2-401, and a
$3,500 exempt property allowance pursuant
to I C § 15-2-402
This appeal is taken from those two orders
Appellant assigns the granting of the allowances as error because such actions
defeat the intentions of the testatrix Mrs
Ewing, the appellant continues, intended
that Mr Ewing receive only community
property and that the daughters receive all
of the deceased's separate property Thus,
awarding Mr Ewing a portion of the separate property defeats the intentions of the
testatrix

ment and Mrs Ewing's failure to include
an election clause in the will resulted in
Mr Ewing receiving at least some of Mrs.
Ewing's separate property As will be discussed below, the separate property was
the only available source for funds for the
allowances
?
[2] A second assignment of error
argues that the two sections of the Idaho
Code under which the allowances were
made are so vague and uncertain as to violate the mandate of Article 3, Section 17
of the Idaho Constitution
That section
provides that ' [e]very act or joint resolution shall be plainly worded, avoiding as
far as practicable the use of technical
terms " Appellant's argument focuses prL-!
manly upon the dual use of "homestead"
in the UPC homestead allowance and the
homestead
exemption
from
execution
found in I C § 55-1001 et seq The Court
finds no confusion in the duality
The
UPC provisions are effective only in the
event the exemption homestead is not se
lected The two statutory schemes are di
rected toward the same end through differ
ent means, and the brief intersection o3
terminology can hardly be said to result n
fatal ambiguity
v

[1] The Court does not agree with the
appellant as to Mrs Ewing's testamentary
intentions While the language of the will
may initially lead to such an interpretation,
the entire testamentary scheme indicates
otherwise Mrs Ewing executed the will,
which was drafted with the aid of an attorney, after the Uniform Probate Code
(hereinafter referred to as UPC) became
effective in Idaho
Under the provisions
of the UPC the surviving spouse is entitled
to both homestead and exempt property al
lowances The UPC also has an election
procedure wherein the testator may draft
the will in such a manner as to require the
surviving spouse to elect between the benefits of the statutory allowances and whatever rights may accrue under the provisions of the will I C § 15-2-206(b)
The
combination of the language of the docu-

[3,4] Appellant further argues tha
vagueness is the result of the failure of the
UPC to specify the property from whicl
the allowance is to be taken first In this
situation the statute is quite clear »T§
"homestead allowance is in addition to ygj
share passing to the surviving spous
* * * by the will of the decede|
* * * " I C § 15-2-401 The will^bj
queathed all decedent's community propert
to the surviving spouse With only sepa
rate property remaining, it is clear tna
that is the sole source for funds for thely
lowance
Thus, the Court rejects appg
lant's claims of unconstitutional vaguenjg
See Nelson v Marshall, 94 Idaho 726,'gg
P2d47(1972)
^B
[5-7] Appellant next argues t n a t J j |
Uniform Probate Code impairs the oblig
tion of a contract and therefore viola^
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Article 1, Section 16 of the Idaho Consti
tution However appellant fails to instruct
the Court on whether she is claiming that
the will itself is a contractual obligation or
whether there was a contract to make a
will involved
A contract to make a will
requires a showing of such by clear and
convincing evidence
The appellant advances no evidence of such, and thus that
argument fails
Thomas v Thomas, 83
Idaho 86, 357 P 2d 935 (1960) Second the
appellant offers no authority to the point
that the will itself constitutes a contract
and we know of none
Also, this Court
has held that 'the right to dispose of property by will is in 'no sense a property right
or a so-called natural right' " l We do not
agree with appellant's position
[8] Finally, appellant argues that the
granting of the allowances to the surviving
spouse denied the other beneficiaries property without due process of law This violates, appellant continues, Article 1, Sec
tion 13 of the Idaho Constitution
Due to
appellant's failure to offer authority for
this position, this Court will not consider
the assignment
Church v Roemer, 94
Idaho 782, 498 P2d 1255 (1972)
Su
preme Court Rules, rule 41
[9] Respondent attempts to assign as
error the district court's disposition of a
joint checking account held by the de
ceased and the surviving spouse
Since
this issue is not before the Court by proper
cross-appeal, the Court will not consider
the issue
Hemminger v T n State Lumber Company, 57 Idaho 697, 68 P 2d 54
(1937) See also Leno v Northwest Cred
t Corporation, 84 Idaho 364, 372 P 2d 765
1962)

96 Idaho 383
A r m i l M G A R N E R and Violet Garner, his
wife, Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
CRATER

tion and Milestone, I n c , an Idaho Corporation, Defendants-Respondents
No

SHEPARD, C J , and McQUADE,
BAKES and McFADDEN, JJ , concur

11331.

Supieme Couit of Idaho
Die 20 1974

Husband and wife brought action for
personal injuries sustained by wife while
employed is operator of potato seed cut
ting machine manufactured by defendant
The District Court, Seventh Judicial Dis
trict, Bingham County, Arnold T Beebe,
J , granted manufacturer's motion for par
tial summary judgment and plaintiff ap
pealed
The Supreme Court, Donaldson,
J , held that questions of fact existed as to
faulty design of the machine and contribu
tory negligence
Reversed and remanded

i

Products L i a b i l i t y <§=>47

Doctrine of strict liability was applica
ble in suit for personal injuries sustained
by employee while working as operator of
high speed potato seed cutting machine
manufactured by defendant
2

Judgment C=>I8I(2)

Summiry judgment is properly grant
ed only when the pleadings, depositions,
admissions, and affidavits on file show
that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact
Rules of Civil Procedure
rule 56(c)
3

[10] For the reasons stated herein, the
)rders of the district court are affirmed
~osts to respondent

F A R M S , I N C , an Idaho Corpora-

Judgment C==>I85(2)

In determining whether an issue of
material fact is in dispute, facts should be
liberally construed in favor of the party
against
whom
summary
judgment
is
sought
Rules of Civil Procedure, rule
56(c)

Hull v Cartin, 61 Idaho 578, 597 105 P 2d 196, 205 (1940) (further citations omitted)

APPENDIX 9

PART 4

M.D.. PC. v. Prout. 754 P.2d 429 (Colo. App.
1988).

EXEMPT PROPERTY AND ALLOWANCES
Cross references: For clarification of the term "surviving spouse", see § 15-11-802.

15-11-401. Applicable law. This part 4 applies to the estate of a decedent who dies
domiciled in this state. Rights to exempt property and a family allowance for a decedent
who dies not domiciled in this state are governed by the law of the decedent's domicile at
death.
Source: L. 94: Entire part R&RE, p. 995, § 3, effective July 1,1995. L. 96: Entire section
amended, p. 657, § 5, effective July 1.
15-11-402. Homestead. The provisions of sections 38-41-201 and 38-41-204, C.R.S., provide for a homestead exemption but shall not create an allowance for the surviving spouse
or minor children. A personal representative's obligation to distribute property as an
exempt property allowance under section 15-11-403, to pay money as a family allowance
under section 15-11-404, or to distribute property to devisees, heirs, or beneficiaries shall
not be considered a debt, contract, or civil obligation, as referred to under sections 38-41201 and 38-41-202. C.R.S.
Source: L. 94: Entire part R&RE, p. 995, § 3, effective July 1, 1995.
15-11-403. Exempt property. The decedent's surviving spouse is entitled to exempt
property from the estate in the form of cash in the amount of or other property of the estate
in the value of fifteen thousand dollars in excess of any security interests therein. If there is
no surviving spouse, the decedent's dependent children are entitled jointly to the same
exempt property. Rights to exempt property have priority over all claims against the estate,
except claims for the costs and expenses of administration, and reasonable funeral and burial, interment, or cremation expenses, which shall be paid in the priority and manner set
forth in section 15-12-805. The right to exempt property shall abate as necessary to permit
payment of the family allowance. These rights are in addition to any benefit or share passing to the surviving spouse or dependent children by the decedent's will, unless otherwise
provided, by intestate succession, or by way of elective-share.
Source: L. 94: Entire part R&RE, p. 995, § 3, effective July 1.1995. L. 96: Entire section
amended, p. 657, § 6, effective July 1.
Law reviews. For article, "Child Support
Obligations After Death of the Supporting Parent", see 16 Colo. Law. 790 (1987). For article,
"Ownership of Personal Property Accumulated
During a Marriage", see 17 Colo. Law. 623
(1988). For article, "Avoiding Litigation in Probate Estates", see 18 Colo. Law. 875 (1989).
Annotator's note: Since § 15-11-403 is similar
to §§ 15-11-402 and 15-11-405 as they existed
prior to the 1994 repeal and reenactment of this
entire part, relevant cases construing those provisions have been included in this section. For
additional cases, see the annotations under former §§ 15-11-402 and 15-11-405 in the 1987
replacement volume.
This section and § 15-11-404 to be read with §
15-11-202 (1). This section and § 15-11-404, providing for family and exempt property
allowances, must be read in conjunction with the
definition of "augmented estate" in § 15-11-202
(1) to determine whether distributing such
allowances from the "augmented estate" is con-

sistent and harmonious with the creation of an
"augmented estate" under the statute. In re
Estate of Novitt, 37 Colo. App. 524, 549 P.2d 805
(1976).
Allowances to be claimed from probate
estate. The language of § 15-11-202 (1) clearly
reflects a legislative intent to establish the family allowance and exempt property allowance as
items to be claimed from the probate estate, if
any, to which are then added certain items to
create the augmented estate. In re Estate of
Novitt, 37 Colo. App. 524,549 P.2d 805 (1976).
Medical services reimbursement funds not
recoverable by treating physicians. Medical services reimbursement funds received by the personal representative are a part of the surviving
spouse's exempt property allowance when there
exists no basis to impress a constructive trust on
such funds. The legislature in enacting this section clearly intended that a surviving spouse's
exempt property allowance have priority over
all claims against the state. Timothy C. Wirt,

Applied in Lopata v. Met/el, 641 P2d 95
(Colo. 1982); Snyder v. Macv, 674 P.2d 972 (Cole
App. 1983).

15-11-404. Family allowance. (1) In addition to the right to exempt property, th
decedent's surviving spouse and minor children who the decedent was obligated to suppoi
and children who were in fact being supported by the decedent are entitled to a reasonabl
allowance in money out of the estate for their maintenance during the period of adminis
tration, which allowance may not continue for longer than one year if the estate is inade
quate to discharge allowed claims. The allowance may be paid as a lump sum or in period
ic installments. It is payable to the surviving spouse, if living, for the use of the survivin
spouse and minor and dependent children; otherwise to the children, or persons havin
their care and custody. If a minor child or dependent child is not living with the survivin
spouse, the allowance may be made partially to the child or his or her guardian or othe
person having the child's care and custody, and partially to the spouse, as their needs ma
appear. The family allowance is exempt from and has priority over all claims except claim
for the costs and expenses of administration, and reasonable funeral and burial, intermen
or cremation expenses, which shall be paid in the priority and manner set forth in sectio
15-12-805.
(2) The family allowance is not chargeable against any benefit or share passing to th
surviving spouse or children by the will of the decedent, unless otherwise provided, b
intestate succession, or by way of elective-share. The death of any person entitled to a fan
ily allowance terminates the right to receive an allowance for any period arising after his c
her death, but does not affect the right of his or her estate to recover the unpaid allowanc
for periods prior to his or her death.
Source: L. 94: Entire part R&RE, p. 996. § 3, effective July 1.1995.
Am. Jur.2d. See 31 Am. Jur.2d, Executors and1
Administiators, § § 324-339.
C.J.S. See 34 C.J.S., Executors and Administrators^ § 344-347.
Law "reviews. For article, "The Widow's
Allowance", see 6 Dicta 11 (April 1929). Forr
article, "Widow's Allowance", see 25 Dicta 240)
(1948). For article, "A Decade of Coloiado LawConflict ot Laws, Security, Contracts and Equity", see 23 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 247 (1951). F01i
article, "'Child Support Obligations after Death1
of the Supporting Parent", see 16 Colo. Law. 790J
(1987). For article, "Ownership of Personal1
Property Accumulated During a Marriage"', see;
17 Colo Law. 623 (1988). For article, "AvoidingI
Litigation in Probate Estates", see 18 Colo Law
875^ 1989).
Annotator's note. The following annotationss
include cases decided under former provisions
similar to this section.
Section 15-11-403 and this section to be readI
with § 15-11-202 (1). Section 15-11-403 and this•>
section, providing for family and exempt pioperty allowances, must be read in conjunction withI
the definition ot "augmented estate" in § 15-11202 (1) to determine whether distiibuting suchi
allowances from the "augmented estate" is consistent and harmonious with the creation of ani
"augmented estate" under the statute. In ret
Estate of Novitt, 37 Colo. App. 524.549 P.2d 8055
(1976).
This section is based upon sound public policy)
which the courts are zealous to effectuate. In re:
Bradley's Estate, 106 Colo. 500, 106 P.2d 10633
(1940); Lyons v. Egan, 107 Colo. 32, 108 P.2d 8733
(1940).

The purpose of this section is to secure su]
port to the widow and children during the perk
of administration, and the piolonged htigatic
which sometimes ensues. Wilson v Wilson, :
Colo 70, 132 P. 67 (1913); In re Bradley's Estat
106 Colo. 500, 106 P.2d 1063 (1940); Lyons
Egan. 107 Colo 32,108 P.2d 873 (1940)
The policy of providing a widow's allowanc
is to protect the surviving spouse duiing tl
peiiod until a final distribution of the estate Cc
be made In re Estate of Pla/za. 34 Colo. Ap
296,526P.2d 155(1974).
Rights in general. A widow may claim hi
allowance or waive it. She may take specif
items or cash. Until her position is made know
or her right is terminated by limitation, proper
of the estate cannot be disposed of and clair
against it can often not be settled Wiaington
Wigington. 112 Colo. 78.145 P2d 980 (1944).
A claim for a widow's allowance is a clai
against the estate of her deceased husban
Bnmhle v Sickler, 83 Colo. 494. 266 P. 4'
(1928); Hale v. Burford, 73 Colo 197. 214 P 5
(1923); In re Williams' Estate, 101 Colo. 262,
P2d 476 (1937); In re Elam's Estate, 104 Co
126, 89 P.2d 243 (1939)
The allowance is a part of the expense of t
administration of an estate. Hale v. Burford,
Colo. 197, 214 P. 543 (1923); Ahlf v King,
Colo. 425, 298 P. 647 (1931); Deeble v. Alertc
58 Colo. 166,143 P. 1096 (1914).
Allowances to be claimed from probi
estate. The language of § 15-11-202 (1) clea
reflects a legislative intent to establish the far
ly allowance and exempt property allowance
items to be claimed from the probate estate
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ot named in will was not intentional, where
ontrary fact did not appear In re Atwood's
Istate, 14 Utah 1, 45 P 1036, 60 Am St R
78 (1896), overruled on other grounds, In re
/tiller's Estate, 31 U t a h 415, 88 P 338 (1906)
An instruction was not to be so worded as to

convey to the jury the thought that the presumption of unintentional omission was itself
evidence, such a charge was prejudicial and erroneous In re Newell's Estate, 78 Utah 463, 5
P 2d 230 (1931)

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A m . Jur. 2d. — 79 Am J u r 2d Wills § 644
C.J.S. — 96 C J S Wills § 718
A.L.R. — Pretermitted heir statutes what
constitutes sufficient testamentary reference

to, or evidence of contemplation of, heir to render statute inapplicable, 83 A L R 4 t h 779.
Key Numbers. — Wills «=» 82

PART 4
EXEMPT PROPERTY AND ALLOWANCES
75-2-401. Homestead allowance — Amount.
A surviving spouse of a decedent who was domiciled in this state is entitled
to a homestead allowance of $10,000. If there is no surviving spouse, each
minor child and each dependent child of the decedent is entitled to a homestead allowance amounting to $10,000 divided by the number of minor and
dependent children of the decedent The homestead allowance is exempt from,
and has priority over, all claims against the estate, except claims for reasonable funeral expenses and expenses of administration The homestead allowance is in addition to any share passing to the surviving spouse or minor or
dependent child by intestate succession, but is chargeable against any share
passing by the will of the decedent, unless the will provides otherwise
History: C. 1953, 75-2-401, enacted by L.
1983, ch. 226, § 2; 1988, ch. 110, § 3.
R e p e a l s and Reenactments. — Laws 1977,
ch 194, § 10 repealed former § 75-2 401 (L
1975, ch 150, § 3), relating to homestead allowance, and enacted a new § 75 2 401
Laws 1983, ch 226, § 2 repealed former
§ 75-2-401 (L 1977, ch 194, § 10), relating to
the homestead, and enacted the above section
Editorial Board Comment. — See
§ 75 2-803 for the definition of "spouse" which
controls in this part Also, see § 75-2-104
Waiver of homestead is covered by § 75-2-204
"Election" between the provision of a will and
homestead is covered by § 75-2-206
A set dollar amount for homestead allowance
[see § 78-23-31 was dictated by the desirability
of having a certain level below which administration may be dispensed with or be handled
summarily, without regard to the size of allowances under § 75-2-402 The "small estate"

line is controlled largely, though not entirely,
by the size of the homestead allowance This is
because Part 12 of Chapter 3 dealing with
small estates rests on the assumption that the
only justification for keeping a decedent's assets from his creditors is to benefit the decedent's spouse and children
Another reason for a set amount is related to
the fact that homestead allowance may prefer
a decedent's minor or dependent children over
his other children It was felt desirable to minimize the consequence of application of an arbitrary age line among children of the testator
Cross-References. — Homestead exemption, Utah Const, Art XXII, Sec
1,
§§ 78-23-3, 78-23-4, exemption from execution,
§ 78-23-5 et seq
Partition proceedings, § 78-39-1 et seq
Spouse, effect of divorce, annulment or separation, § 75-2-803
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ANALYSIS

Constitutionality
Admi nistration
Children
Construction and application
Exemption from payment of debts.
Right to dispose of homestead
Right to homestead
C constitutionality.
Constitutional provision setting up equality
of rights of ownership of separate property by
married woman, and eliminating the commonlaw incapacity, did not confer rights upon
wives different from those of husbands, and did
not invalidate statute giving husband homestead in property of deceased wife In re
Petersen's Estate, 97 Utah 324, 93 P 2d 445
(1939)
Administration.
Contention of widow that legal right of administrator could not be enforced because
there were no debts and value of the property
would not exceed the exemptions to which she
was entitled under former provisions was without merit Columbia Trust Co v Anglum, 63
Utah 353, 225 P 1089 (1924)
It was not a valid objection to a claim of
homestead that the parties had not resided on
the property, or that the property was held in
cotenancy with a stranger In re Petersen's Estate, 97 Utah 324, 93 P 2d 445 (1939)
The amount of property owned by the person
claiming homestead was not material to a de
termination of whether homestead should be
allowed In re Petersen's Estate, 97 Utah 324,
93 P 2d 445 (1939)
Children.
"Children" was used in homestead provisions
of former succession statutes in its common
sense In re Walton's Estate, 115 Utah 160, 203
P 2d 393 (1949)
Construction and application.
Homestead being constitutional creation, all
laws relating thereto were to be liberally construed to protect it and make it effective for
dependent and helpless, to ensure them shelter
and support In re Mower's Estate, 93 Utah
390, 73 P 2d 967 (1937), In re Petersen's Estate, 97 Utah 324, 93 P 2d 445 (1939)

Exemption from payment of debts.
Reasonable expenses of decedent's last illness and funeral expenses as well as administration expenses were preferred claims against
estate, and when necessary, homestead property was subject to their payment In re
Thorn's Estate, 24 Utah 209, 67 P 22 (1901),
In re Petersen's Estate, 69 Utah 484, 256 P
409 (1927), In re Mower's Estate, 93 Utah 390,
73 P 2d 967 (1937)
Right to dispose of homestead.
Under former statute, right to dispose of
homestead property by will was limited to such
estates as exceeded homestead limit in value
In re Little, 22 Utah 204, 61 P 899 (1900)
Under former provisions husband could dispose of all his estate by will subject to homestead rights of widow and minor children, if
wife's one-third elective interest was not in excess of homestead allowance, but if one-third
exceeded the homestead, he could only devise
from his widow two-thirds of his realty In re
Mower's Estate, 93 Utah 390, 73 P 2d 967
(1937), holding statutory amendment rendered
inoperable rule in In re Schenk's Estate, 53
Utah 381,178 P 344 (1919) (widow renouncing
will could claim distributive one third share,
but not homestead)
Right to homestead.
Homestead belonged to heirs to whom it was
set apart, and heirs who were of age at time of
death of intestate or at time homestead was set
apart had no interest therein Christiansen v
Robinson, 35 Utah 67, 99 P 458 (1909)
Where real estate was set apart as homestead to surviving wife of husband and minor
children, it became theirs absolutely, subject
only to valid hens or mortgages, fact that value
of property thereafter exceeded limit of statutory homestead exemption would not authorize
reopening of estate In re Bedford's Estate, 34
U t a h 24, 95 P 518, 16 L R A (n s ) 728, 16
Ann Cas 118 (1908)
Upon death of husband or wife, surviving
spouse, by operation of law, was vested with
right of occupancy and use of homestead, and
this right continued until otherwise directed
by court, even though survivor remarried In re
Hansen's Estate, 55 Utah 23, 184 P 197
(1919)

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Exemptions from
Utah's Estate Tax, 1970 Utah L Rev 42
Brigham Young Law Review. — Articles
II and III of the Uniform Probate Code as En
acted in Utah, 1976 B Y U L Rev 425

Am. Jur. 2d. — 40 Am J u r 2d Homstead
§ 3
C.J.S. — 40 C J S Homesteads § 166
A.L.R. — Previous judgment or agreement
for their support, statutory family allowance to
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minor children as affected by, 6 A L R 3d 1387
Waiver of right to widow's allowance by postnuptial agreement, 9 A L R 3d 1319
Illegitimate child, eligibility to receive fam-

ily allowance out of estate of his deceased father, 12 A L R 3 d 1140
Key Numbers. — Homestead &= 134

75-2-402. Exempt property — Amount.
In addition to the homestead allowance, the surviving spouse of a decedent
who was domiciled in this state is entitled from the estate to value not exceeding $5,000 in excess of any security interests therein m household furniture,
automobiles, furnishings, appliances, and personal effects. If there is no surviving spouse, children of the decedent are entitled jointly to the same value.
If encumbered chattels are selected and if the value m excess of security
interests, plus that of other exempt property, is less than $5,000, or if there is
not $5,000 worth of exempt property in the estate, the spouse or children are
entitled to other assets of the estate, if any, to the extent necessary to make up
the $5,000 value. Rights to exempt property and assets needed to make up a
deficiency of exempt property have priority over all claims against the estate,
except reasonable funeral expenses, and the right to any assets to make up a
deficiency of exempt property shall abate as necessary to permit prior payment of the reasonable funeral expenses, homestead allowance, and family
allowance. These rights are in addition to any benefit or share passing to the
surviving spouse or children by intestate succession, but is chargeable against
any share passing by the will of the decedent unless the will provides other-

History: C. 1953, 75-2-402, enacted by L.
1975, ch. 150, § 3; 1988, ch. 110, § 4.
Editorial Board Comment. — Unlike the
exempt values described in §§ 75-2-401 and
75-2-403, the exempt values described in this
section are available in a case where the decedent left no spouse but left only adult children
The possible difference between beneficiaries
of the exemptions described by §§ 75-2-401
and 75-2-403, and this section, explain the provision in this section which establishes priorities

Section 75-2-204 covers waiver of exempt
property rights, and § 75-2-206 covers the
question of whether a decedent's will may put
a spouse to an election with reference to exemptions
Cross-References. — Effect of divorce, annulment and decree of separation, § 75-2-803
Waiver of rights by surviving spouse,
§ 75-2-204

NOTES TO DECISIONS
widow her exempt property claim from multiple-party accounts in the name of the decedent's daughter where the estate was insufficient to satisfy the claim In re Estate of
Wagley, 760 P 2d 316 (Utah 1988)

ANALYSIS

Insufficiency of estate
—Multiple-party accounts
Insufficiency of estate.
—Multiple-party a c c o u n t s .
It was error for the probate court to deny the
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75-2-403

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 31 Am J u r 2d Executors
and Administrators §§ 496, 762
C. J . S . — 34 C J S Executors and Administrators §§ 323 to 366

75-2-403.

Key Numbers. — Executors and Administrators <s= 173 to 201

Family allowance.

(1) In addition to the right to homestead allowance and exempt property, if
the decedent was domiciled m this state, the surviving spouse and minor
children whom the decedent was obligated to support and children who were
in fact being supported by him are entitled to a reasonable allowance in
money out of the estate for their maintenance during the period of administration. The allowance may date from the death of the decedent but may not
continue for longer than one year if the estate is inadequate to discharge
allowed claims. The allowance may be paid as a lump sum or in periodic
installments. It is payable to the surviving spouse, if living, for the use of the
surviving spouse and minor and dependent children; otherwise to the children, or persons having their care and custody; but in case any minor child or
dependent child is not living with the surviving spouse, the allowance may be
made partially to the child or his guardian or other person having his care and
custody, and partially to the spouse, as their needs may appear. The family
allowance is exempt from and has priority over all claims but not over reasonable funeral expenses and the homestead allowance.
(2) The family allowance is not chargeable against any benefit or share
passing to the surviving spouse or children by the will of the decedent unless
otherwise provided, by intestate succession, or by way of elective share. The
death of any person entitled to family allowance terminates his right to allowances not yet paid.
History: C. 1953, 75-2-403, enacted by L.
1975, ch. 150, § 3.
Editorial Board Comment. — The allowance provided by this section does not qualify
for the marital deduction under the Federal
Estate Tax Act [26 U S C § 2001 et seq ] because the interest is terminable A broad code
must provide the best possible protection for
the family m all cases, even though this may
not provide desired tax advantages for certain
larger estates In estates falling in the federal
estate tax bracket where careful planning may
be expected, it is important to the operation of
formula clauses that the family allowance be
clearly terminable or clearly nontermmable
With the proposed section clearly creating a
terminable interest, estate planners can create
a plan which will operate with certainty
Finally, in order to facilitate administration of
this allowance without court supervision it is
necessary to provide a fairly simple and definite framework
In determining the amount of the family allowance, account should be taken of both the
previous standard of living and the nature of
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other resources available to the family to meet
current living expenses until the estate can be
administered and assets distributed While the
death of the principal income producer may necessitate some change in the standard of living,
there must also be a period of adjustment If
the surviving spouse has a substantial income,
this may be taken into account Whether life
insurance proceeds payable in a lump sum or
periodic installments were intended by the decedent to be used for the period of adjustment
or to be conserved as capital may be considered A living trust may provide the needed
income without resorting to the probate estate
If a husband has been the principal source of
family support, a wife should not be expected
to use her capital to support the family
Obviously, need is relative to the circumstances, and what is reasonable must be decided on the basis of the facts of each individual case Note, however, that under the next
section the personal representative may not
determine an allowance of more t h a n
[a total
of $6,0001, a court order would be necessary if a
greater allowance is reasonably necessary.

75-2-404

UNIFORM PROBATE CODE
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Amount of allowance
Disclosing personal wealth
Discontinuance of allowance
Forfeiture of allowance
Inheritance tax
Right to allowance
Amount of allowance.
In fixing the amount of the allowance for
support during administration, the age of the
survivor or survivors, their health, social position, and standing, the education of the chil
dren, the value of the estate, its solvency or
insolvency, and value and nature of the
widow's own separate property were to be considered In re Pugsley's Estate, 27 Utah 489, 76
P 560 (1904), In re Bundy's Estate, 121 Utah
299, 241 P 2 d 462 (1952)
Disclosing personal wealth.
In filing petition for family allowance, widow
and administratrix was to fully disclose her
personal wealth In re Bundy's Estate, 121
Utah 299, 241 P 2d 462 (1952)
Discontinuance of allowance.
Where there was a prolonged administration
which appeared to have diluted the estate
through a family allowance and where there
was no evident necessity for such prolongation,
the allowance should not have been continued
In re Bundy's Estate, 121 Utah 299, 241 P 2d
462 (1952)

Forfeiture of allowance.
Wife who had for many years before death of
husband lived, pursuant to agreement, separate and apart from him, and was not dependent on him for support, was not entitled to
family allowance on his death under former
statute In re Park's Estate, 25 Utah 161, 69 P
671 (1902)
Under former statute, widow did not forfeit
h e r allowance where evidence showed she was
not voluntarily living separate and apart from
husband In re Beason's Estate, 49 Utah 24,
161 P 678 (1916)
Inheritance tax.
On appeal from order excluding family allowance in fixing amount of inheritance tax,
Supreme Court could not consider propriety of
amount allowed In re Green's Estate, 78 Utah
139, 1 P 2d 968 (1931)
Right to allowance
Provisions in former Probate Code that court
could exclude persons with separate property
or income from the family allowance altered
rule of In re Pugsley's estate, 27 Utah 489, 76
p 560 (1904), the family allowance was no longer an absolute right and court could consider
t h e extent and nature of the claimant's property m determining the amount of, or in denying, the allowance In re Bundy's Estate, 121
U t a h 299, 241 P 2d 462 (1952)

75-2-404. Source, determination, and documentation.
If the estate is otherwise sufficient, property specifically devised is not used
to satisfy rights to homestead and exempt property Subject to this restriction,
the surviving spouse, the guardians of t h e minor children, or children who are
adults may select property of the estate as homestead allowance and exempt
property The personal representative m a y make these selections if the surviving spouse, the children or the g u a r d i a n s of the minor children are unable
or fail to do so within a reasonable t i m e or if there are no guardians of the
minor children The personal representative may execute an instrument or
deed of distribution to establish the ownership of property taken as homestead
allowance or exempt property He m a y determine the family allowance and
may disburse funds of the estate in p a y m e n t of the family allowance in a lump
sum or periodic installments, or a combination, but not exceeding the total
sum of $6,000 The personal representative or any interested person aggrieved
by any selection, determination, p a y m e n t , proposed payment, or failure to act
under this section may petition the court for appropriate relief, which relief
may provide a family allowance l a r g e r or smaller than that which the personal representative determined or could have determined
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History: C. 1953, 75-2-404, enacted by L.
1975, ch. 150, § 3; 1979, ch. 245, § 1.
Editorial Board
Comment. — See
§§ 75 3 902, 75-3-906 and 75 3 907

75-2-501

Cross-References. — Distribution in kind,
§§ 75-3 906, 75-3 907
Distribution, order in which assets distributed, abatement, § 75-3-902

PART 5
WILLS
Editorial Board Comment. — Part 5 of Chapter 2 deals with capacity and formalities for
execution and revocation of wills If the will is to be restored to its role as the major instrument
for disposition of wealth at death, its execution must be kept simple The basic intent of these
sections is to validate the will whenever possible To this end, the age for making wills is lowered
to eighteen, formalities for a written and attested will are kept to a minimum, holographic wills
written and signed by the testator are authorized, choice of law as to validity of execution is
broadened, and revocation by operation of law is limited to divorce or annulment However, the
statute also provides for a more formal method of execution with acknowledgement before a
public officer (the self proved will)
These family protection provisions supply the basis for the important small estate provisions of
Chapter 3, Part 12
States adopting the Code may see fit to alter the dollar amounts suggested in these sections or
vary the terms and conditions in other ways so as to accommodate existing traditions Although
creditors of estates would be aided somewhat if all family exemption provisions relating to probate estates were the same throughout the country there is relatively less need for uniformity of
law regarding these provisions than is true of any of the other parts of this article Still, it is quite
important for all states to limit their homestead, allowance and exempt property provisions, if
any, so that they apply only to estates of decedents who were domicihanes of the state
Notice that § 75-2 104 imposes a requirement of survival of the decedent for 120 hours on any
spouse or child claiming under this part

75-2-501. Who may make a will.
Any person 18 or more years of age who is of sound mind may make a will
History: C. 1953, 75-2-501, enacted by L.
1975, ch. 150, § 3.
Editorial Board Comment — This section
states a uniform minimum age of eighteen for
capacity to execute a will 'Minor" is defined m
§ 75-1 201, and may involve a different age
than that prescribed here

Cross-References. — Custody and deposit
of wills, § 75-2 901
Dower and curtesy abolished, § 75 2-113
Right of married woman to take by will and
make a will, Utah Const, Art XXII, Sec 2,
§ 30 2 1

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

proponent of will could meet that by proof of a
negative, that is, that he did not procure the
execution of the will by undue influence, and
testator was not mentally incapable In re
Bryan's Estate, 82 Utah 390, 25 P 2d 602
(1933)

Burden of proof
County as devisee
Disinheritance
Expert and opinion evidence
Legislative control
Limitations on testamentary capacity of married men
Mental competency
Old age
Testamentary capacity

County as devisee.
Testamentary disposition to county hospital
could be taken by the county as a corporation
Manatakis' Estate v Walker Bank & Trust
C o , 5 Utah 2d 412, 303 P 2d 701 (1956)

Burden of proof.
Burden of proof was on contestant to show
mental incapacity and undue influence, the

Disinheritance.
Testator was acting wholly within his rights
in bequeathing the bulk of his property and
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(4) In satisfying a share provided by Subsection (l)(a), devises made by the
will abate under Section 75-3-902.
History: C. 1953, 75-2-302, enacted by L.
1998, ch. 39, § 38.
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws
1998, ch 39, § 38 repeals former § 75-2-302, as

last amended by Laws 1988, ch 110, § 2,
relating to pretermitted children m a will, and
enacts the present section, effective July 1,
1998

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Cited in In re Estate of Jones, 858 P2d 983
(Utah 1993)

PART 4
EXEMPT PROPERTY AND ALLOWANCES
75-2-401. Exempt property and allowances — Applicable
law.
This part applies to the estate of a decedent who dies domiciled in Utah.
Rights to homestead allowance, exempt property, and family allowance for a
decedent who dies not domiciled in Utah are governed by the law of the
decedent's domicile at death.
History: C. 1953, 75-2-401, e n a c t e d by L.
1998, ch. 39, § 39.
R e p e a l s and Reenactments. — Laws
1998, ch 39, § 39 repeals former § 75-2-401, as

last amended by Laws 1988, ch 110, § 3,
relating to homestead allowance and amount,
and enacts the present section, effective July 1,
1998

75-2-402. Homestead allowance.
A decedent's surviving spouse is entitled to a homestead allowance of
$15,000. If there is no surviving spouse, each minor child and each dependent
child of the decedent is entitled to a homestead allowance amounting to
$15,000 divided by the number of minor and dependent children of the
decedent. The homestead allowance is exempt from and has priority over all
claims of the estate. Unless otherwise provided by the will or governing
instrument, the homestead allowance is chargeable against any benefit or
share passing to the surviving spouse, minor, or dependent child, by the will of
the decedent, by intestate succession, by way of elective share, and by way of
nonprobate transfers as defined in Sections 75-2-205 and 75-2-206.
History: C. 1953, 75-2-402, enacted by L.
1998, ch. 39, § 40.
Repeals and R e e n a c t m e n t s . — Laws
1998, ch 39, § 40 repeals former § 75-2-402, as

last amended by Laws 1988, ch 110, § 4,
relating to exempt property amount, and enacts the present section, effective July 1, 1998

75-2-403. Exempt property.
In addition to the homestead allowance, the decedent's surviving spouse is
entitled from the estate to a value, not exceeding $10,000 in excess of any
security interests therein, in household furniture, automobiles, furnishings,
appliances, and personal effects. If there is no surviving spouse, the decedent's
children are entitled jointly to the same value. If encumbered chattels are
selected and the value in excess of security interests, plus that of other exempt
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property, is less than $10,000, or if there is not $10,000 worth of ex
property in the estate, the spouse or children are entitled to other assets c
estate, if any, to the extent necessary to make up the $10,000 value Ri^r
exempt property and assets needed to makeup a deficiency of exempt proi
have priority over all claims against the estate, but the right to any asse
make up a deficiency of exempt property abates as necessary to permit eg
payment of homestead allowance and family allowance Unless othe°
provided by the will or governing instrument, the exempt property all
is chargeable against any benefit or share passing to the surviving S pou
any, or if there is no surviving spouse, to the decedent's children, by the w
the decedent, by intestate succession, by way of elective share, and by w
nonprobate transfers as defined in Sections 75-2-205 and 75-2-206.
History: C. 1953, 75-2-403, e n a c t e d by L.
1998, ch. 39, § 41.
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws
1998, ch 39, § 41 repeals former § 75-2-403, as

enacted by Laws 1975, ch 150, § 3, relal
family allowance, and enacts the presei
tion, effective July 1, 1998

75-2-404, Family allowance.
(1) In addition to the right to homestead allowance and exempt propert:
decedent's surviving spouse and minor children whom the decedent
obligated to support and children who were in fact being supported b}
decedent are entitled to a reasonable allowance in money out of the estat
their maintenance during the period of administration, which allowance
not continue for longer than one year if the estate is inadequate to discb
allowed claims. The allowance may be paid as a lump sum or in per
installments. It is payable to the surviving spouse, if living, for the use o
surviving spouse and minor and dependent children; otherwise to the chile
or persons having their care and custody. If a minor child or dependent ch
not living with the surviving spouse, the allowance may be made partial
the child or his guardian or other person having the child's care and cus
and partially to the spouse, as their needs may appear. The family allow
is exempt from and has priority over all claims except the homes
allowance.
(2) Unless otherwise provided by the will or governing instrument,
family allowance is chargeable against any benefit or share passing to
surviving spouse or minor children, by the will of the decedent, by intes
succession, by way of elective share, and by way of nonprobate transfei
defined in Sections 75-2-205 and 75-2-206. The death of any person entith
family allowance terminates the right to allowances not yet paid.
History: C. 1953, 75-2-404, e n a c t e d by L.
1998, ch. 39, § 42.
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws
1998, ch 39, § 42 repeals former § 75-2-404, as

last amended by Laws 1979, ch 245,
relating to source, determination, and
mentation of estate, and enacts the pr
section, effective July 1, 1998

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Amount of allowance.
The factors to be used in determining the
amount of the family allowance during administration include the age of the surviving
spouse, the surviving spouse's health, the sur-

viving spouse's previous standard of hvinj
value of the estate, and the value and nati
the surviving spouse's own separate pro]
Hamilton v Hamilton, 869 P 2 d 971 (Uta
App ), cert denied, 879 P 2 d 266 (Utah 15

75-2-405

75-2-405.
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History: C. 1953, 75-2-405, enacted b y L.
1998, ch. 39, § 43.

Effective Dates. — Laws 1998, ch 39, § 105
makes the act effective on July 1, 1998.

A.L.R. — Alzheimer's disease as affecting
testamentary capacity, 47 A L R 5th 523

75-2-502. Execution — Witnessed wills — Holographic
wills.
(1) Except as provided in Subsection (2) and in Sections 75-2-503, 75-2-506
and 75-2-513, a will shall be:
(a) in writing;
(b) signed by the testator or in the testator's name by some othe
individual in the testator's conscious presence and by the testator'
direction; and
(c) signed by at least two individuals, each of whom signed within
reasonable time after he witnessed either the signing of the will a
described in Subsection (l)(b) or the testator's acknowledgment of the
signature or acknowledgment of the will.
(2) A will that does not comply with Subsection (1) is valid as a holograph]
will, whether or not witnessed, if the signature and material portions of tb
document are in the testator's handwriting.
(3) Intent that the document constitutes the testator's will can be estal
lished by extrinsic evidence, including, for holographic wills, portions of tb
document that are not in the testator's handwriting.
History: C. 1953, 75-2-502, enacted by L.
1998, ch. 39, § 45.
Repeals and R e e n a c t m e n t s . — Laws
1998, ch 39, § 45 repeals former § 75-2-502, as

75-2-501. Who may make will.
An individual 18 or more years of age who is of sound mind may make a will.
History: C. 1953, 75-2-501, enacted b y L.
1998, ch. 39, § 44.
R e p e a l s and R e e n a c t m e n t s . — Laws
1998, ch 39, § 44 repeals former § 75-2-501, as

enacted by Laws 1975, ch. 150, § 3, relating to
who may make a will, and enacts the present
section, effective July 1, 1998.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Testamentary capacity.
A Veteran's Administration incompetency
rating, and resulting conservatorships and
guardianship, did not create a presumption of
decedent's incapacity to make a will; however,
such indicia of diminished mental capacity did,
at least, neutralize the presumption of testa-

mentary capacity and left the proponent of the
will with the burden to show, by a simple
preponderance of the evidence, that decedent
had the requisite mental capacity to make a
valid will Montes Family v. Carter, 878 P.2d
H 6 8 (Utah Ct. App. 1994)

enacted by Laws 1975, ch 150, § 3, relating
execution of a will, and enacts t h e prese
section, effective July 1, 1998.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

PART 5
WILLS

75-'Z-ou<3

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Source, determination, and documentation.

(1) If the estate is otherwise sufficient, property specifically devised may not
be used to satisfy rights to homestead allowance or exempt property. Subject to
this restriction, the surviving spouse, guardians of minor children, or children
who are adults may select property of the estate as homestead allowance and
exempt property. The personal representative may make those selections if the
surviving spouse, the children, or the guardians of the minor children are
unable or fail to do so within a reasonable time or there is no guardian of a
minor child. The personal representative may execute an instrument or deed
of distribution to establish the ownership of property taken as homestead
allowance or exempt property The personal representative may determine the
family allowance in a lump sum not exceeding $18,000 or periodic installments
not exceeding $1,500 per month for one year, and may disburse funds of the
estate in payment of the family allowance and any part of the homestead
allowance payable in cash. The personal representative or an interested person
aggrieved by any selection, determination, payment, proposed payment, or
failure to act under this section may petition the court for appropriate relief,
which may include a family allowance other than that which the personal
representative determined or could have determined.
(2) If the right to an elective share is exercised on behalf of a surviving
spouse who is an incapacitated person, the personal representative may add
any unexpended portions payable under the homestead allowance, exempt
property, and family allowance to the trust established under Subsection
75-2-212(2).

INTESTATE SUCCESSION AND WILLS

Holographic wills.
—Holographic codicil.
Trial court erred in ruling that a handwritten
document signed by the testator which directed
the disposition of personal property, including
money, was a memorandum under former § 75-

2-513, as the document met the requirements
a holographic will under former section § 75
5 0 3 a n d therefore could have been a codicil
t h e t e s t a t o r ' s w l U l f l t w a s s h o W n to have be
w n t t e n a f t e r t h e w l U I n r e E s t a t e o f Klemim
g 7 Q p 2 d 1 2 g6 (Utah 1998).

75-2-503. Writings intended as wills.
Although a document or writing added upon a document was not executed
compliance with Section 75-2-502, the document or writing is treated as ii
had been executed in compliance with that section if the proponent of t
document or writing establishes by clear and convincing evidence that i
decedent intended the document or writing to constitute:
(1) the decedent's will;
(2) a partial or complete revocation of the will;
(3) an addition to or an alteration of the will; or
(4) a partial or complete revival of his formerly revoked will or o
formerly revoked portion of the will.
History: C. 1953, 75-2-503, enacted by L.
1998, ch. 39, <> 46.
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws
1998, ch 39, § 46 repeals former § 75-2-503, as

last amended by Laws 1977, ch 194, §
relating to holographic wil s, and enacts
present section, effective July 1, l y y o .

